Related papers: An evolutionary view on equilibrium models of tran…

Biological machines like molecular motors and enzymes operate in dynamic cycles representable as stochastic flows on networks. Current stochastic dynamics describes such flows on fixed networks. Here, we develop a scalable approach to…

In the paper we show that an important class of multistage traffic equillibrium models (including correspondence matrix calculation, traffic assignment problem etc) and their economic generalizations can be considered as proper population…

To our knowledge, the populations are generally assumed to be homogeneous in the traditional approach to evolutionary game dynamics. Here, we focus on the inhomogeneous populations. A simple model which can describe the inhomogeneity of the…

In this paper, we consider a dynamic equilibrium transportation problem. There is a fixed number of cars moving from origin to destination areas. Preferences for arrival times are expressed as a cost of arriving before or after the…

In this paper we consider the application of several gradient methods to the traffic assignment problem: we search equilibria in the stable dynamics model (Nesterov and De Palma, 2003) and the Beckmann model. Unlike the celebrated…

Authors describe a two-stage traffic assignment model. It contains of two blocks. The first block consists of model for calculating correspondence (demand) matrix, whereas the second block is a traffic assignment model. The first model…

Modern generative models can be understood as probability transport from a simple base distribution to a target data distribution. Deterministic transport models offer tractable velocity-field parameterizations, whereas stochastic…

The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…

Existing theoretical models of evolution focus on the relative fitness advantages of different mutants in a population while the dynamic behavior of the population size is mostly left unconsidered. We here present a generic stochastic model…

In this paper, we show that different types of evolutionary game dynamics are, in principle, special cases of a dynamical system model based on our previously reported framework of generalized growth transforms. The framework shows that…

In the work two ways of evolutionary interpretation of entropy model for correspondence matrix calculation are proposed. Both approaches based on the stochastic chemical kinetic evolution under the detailed balance condition. The first…

Building upon the eco-evolutionary game dynamics framework established by Tilman et al., we investigate stochastic fluctuations in a two-strategy system incorporating environmental feedback mechanisms, where the payoff matrix exhibits…

We study a model of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics in which the probabilities that agents choose suboptimal actions are dependent on payoff consequences. We prove a sample path large deviation principle, characterizing the rate of…

In this paper we consider a mean field approach to modeling the agents flow over a transportation network. In particular, beside a standard framework of mean field games, with controlled dynamics by the agents and costs mass-distribution…

We consider multi-player games played on graphs, in which the players aim at fulfilling their own (not necessarily antagonistic) objectives. In the spirit of evolutionary game theory, we suppose that the players have the right to repeatedly…

We initiate the study of game dynamics in the population protocol model: $n$ agents each maintain a current local strategy and interact in pairs uniformly at random. Upon each interaction, the agents play a two-person game and receive a…

We consider an integro-differential model for evolutionary game theory which describes the evolution of a population adopting mixed strategies. Using a reformulation based on the first moments of the solution, we prove some analytical…

This paper analyzes the stationary distributions of populations governed by the discrete stochastic logistic and Ricker difference equations at equilibrium examines with the gamma distribution. We identify mathematical relationships between…

Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…