Related papers: Evolution of cooperation under a generalized death…
In social dilemmas under weak selection, the capacity for a player to exhibit updating passivity or interact with its own strategy can lead to conflicting outcomes. The central question is which effect is stronger and how their simultaneous…
Population structure and spatial heterogeneity are integral components of evolutionary dynamics, in general, and of evolution of cooperation, in particular. Structure can promote the emergence of cooperation in some populations and suppress…
Spatial structure is one of the simplest and most studied ecological factors that affect the evolution of cooperation. It has been shown that spatial reciprocity promotes cooperation due to the formation of cooperative clusters, which…
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new…
We study the emergence of cooperation in structured populations with any arrangement of cooperators and defectors on the evolutionary graph. Using structure coefficients defined for configurations describing such arrangements of any number…
While actors in a population can interact with anyone else freely, social relations significantly influence our inclination towards particular individuals. The consequence of such interactions, however, may also form the intensity of our…
Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…
The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common behaviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and engage in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma or the Snowdrift…
Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…
Evolution occurs in populations of reproducing individuals. The structure of a biological population affects which traits evolve. Understanding evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations is difficult. Precise results have been…
The phenomenon of group cooperation constitutes a fundamental mechanism underlying various social and biological systems. Complex networks provide a structural framework for group interactions, where individuals can not only obtain…
We propose a strategy for achieving maximum cooperation in evolutionary games on complex networks. Each individual is assigned a weight that is proportional to the power of its degree, where the exponent alpha is an adjustable parameter…
The evolution of cooperative behaviour is studied in the deterministic version of the Prisoners' Dilemma on a two-dimensional lattice. The payoff parameter is set at the critical region $1.8 < b < 2.0$ , where clusters of cooperators are…
The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of…
Game theory provides a quantitative framework for analyzing the behavior of rational agents. The Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma in particular has become a standard model for studying cooperation and cheating, with cooperation often emerging as…
We explore the evolution of cooperation in the framework of the evolutionary game theory using the prisoner's dilemma as metaphor of the problem. We present a minimal model taking into account the growing process of the systems and…
Population structure affects the outcome of natural selection. Static population structures can be described by graphs, where individuals occupy the nodes, and interactions occur along the edges. General conditions for evolutionary success…
In this work we study the behavior of classical two-person, two-strategies evolutionary games on a class of weighted networks derived from Barab\'asi-Albert and random scale-free unweighted graphs. Using customary imitative dynamics, our…