Related papers: Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited
To divide a cake into equal sized pieces most people use a knife and a mixture of luck and dexterity. These attempts are often met with varying success. Through precise geometric constructions performed with the knife replacing Euclid's…
In classic fair division problems such as cake cutting and rent division, envy-freeness requires that each individual (weakly) prefer his allocation to anyone else's. On a conceptual level, we argue that envy-freeness also provides a…
This paper studies fair division of divisible and indivisible items among agents whose cardinal preferences are not necessarily monotone. We establish the existence of fair divisions and develop approximation algorithms to compute them. We…
In this paper, we show algorithms for solving the cake-cutting problem in sublinear-time. More specifically, we preassign (simple) fair portions to o(n) players in o(n)-time, and minimize the damage to the rest of the players. All currently…
We consider the classic cake cutting problem in the Robertson-Webb model, with the objective of proportional fairness. We show that any randomized algorithm must use $\Omega(n \log n)$ queries.
We consider the problem of partitioning an undirected graph (representing a social network) over $n$ nodes and max degree $\Delta$ into $k$ equally sized parts. Each node in the graph, representing an agent, derives utility proportional to…
We consider the problem of fairly dividing a set of items. Much of the fair division literature assumes that the items are `goods' i.e., they yield positive utility for the agents. There is also some work where the items are `chores' that…
Consider n straight line cuts of a circular pizza made so as to maximize the number of pieces. We investigate how fair such a maximal division may be and how many slices are obtained if the cuts are successfully made with a certain…
We consider the classic cake-cutting problem of producing envy-free allocations, restricted to the case of four agents. The problem asks for a partition of the cake to four agents, so that every agent finds her piece at least as valuable as…
We study the fair allocation of undesirable indivisible items, or chores. While the case of desirable indivisible items (or goods) is extensively studied, with many results known for different notions of fairness, less is known about the…
We consider the well-studied cake cutting problem in which the goal is to identify a fair allocation based on a minimal number of queries from the agents. The problem has attracted considerable attention within various branches of computer…
We study the algorithmic complexity of fair division problems with a focus on minimizing the number of queries needed to find an approximate solution with desired accuracy. We show for several classes of fair division problems that under…
We propose a class of two person perfect information games based on weighted graphs. One of these games can be described in terms of a round pizza which is cut radially into pieces of varying size. The two players alternately take pieces…
In this note we study how to share a good between n players in a simple and equitable way. We give a short proof for the existence of such fair divisions.
In the recently introduced model of fair partitioning of friends, there is a set of agents located on the vertices of an underlying graph that indicates the friendships between the agents. The task is to partition the graph into $k$…
We study the classic problem of \emph{fairly} dividing a heterogeneous and divisible resource -- modeled as a line segment $[0,1]$ and typically called as a \emph{cake} -- among $n$ agents. This work considers an interesting variant of the…
We consider fair allocation of indivisible items under an additional constraint: there is an undirected graph describing the relationship between the items, and each agent's share must form a connected subgraph of this graph. This framework…
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
We model the societal task of redistricting political districts as a partitioning problem: Given a set of $n$ points in the plane, each belonging to one of two parties, and a parameter $k$, our goal is to compute a partition $\Pi$ of the…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…