Related papers: ApproxED: Approximate exploitability descent via l…

Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for solving imperfect-information games in practice. However, it has a major drawback: it does not preclude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree that are not reached in equilibrium.…

We tackle the problem of learning equilibria in simulation-based games. In such games, the players' utility functions cannot be described analytically, as they are given through a black-box simulator that can be queried to obtain noisy…

Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…

The Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal and without the capability of correlating their strategies in strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept can…

Auctions are modeled as Bayesian games with continuous type and action spaces. Determining equilibria in auction games is computationally hard in general and no exact solution theory is known. We introduce an algorithmic framework in which…

We study a setting in which two players play a (possibly approximate) Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, while a learner observes only their actions and has no knowledge of the equilibrium or the underlying game. A natural question is…

We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: - Even the weakest…

In \emph{bandwidth allocation games} (BAGs), the strategy of a player consists of various demands on different resources. The player's utility is at most the sum of these demands, provided they are fully satisfied. Every resource has a…

This paper investigates the convergence time of log-linear learning to an $\epsilon$-efficient Nash equilibrium in potential games, where an efficient Nash equilibrium is defined as the maximizer of the potential function. Previous…

This work considers a stochastic Nash game in which each player solves a parameterized stochastic optimization problem. In deterministic regimes, best-response schemes have been shown to be convergent under a suitable spectral property…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…

This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…

We study multi-strategies in multiplayer reachability games played on finite graphs. A multi-strategy prescribes a set of possible actions, instead of a single action as usual strategies: it represents a set of all strategies that are…

We study a multi-leader single-follower congestion game where multiple users (leaders) choose one resource out of a set of resources and, after observing the realized loads, an adversary (single-follower) attacks the resources with maximum…

Computing Nash equilibria for strategic multi-agent systems is challenging for expensive black box systems. Motivated by the ubiquity of games involving exploitation of common resources, this paper considers the above problem for potential…

In zero-sum games, the optimal strategy is well-defined by the Nash equilibrium. However, it is overly conservative when playing against suboptimal opponents and it can not exploit their weaknesses. Limited look-ahead game solving in…