Related papers: Computing Adequately Permissive Assumptions for Sy…

Iterated admissibility is a well-known and important concept in classical game theory, e.g. to determine rational behaviors in multi-player matrix games. As recently shown by Berwanger, this concept can be soundly extended to infinite games…

We study two-player games with alternating moves played on infinite trees. Our main focus is on the case where the trees are full (regular) and the winning set is open (with respect to the product topology on the tree). Gale and Stewart…

We propose a generic mechanism for incentivizing behavior in an arbitrary finite game using payments. Doing so is trivial if the mechanism is allowed to observe all actions taken in the game, as this allows it to simply punish those agents…

In a mean-payoff parity game, one of the two players aims both to achieve a qualitative parity objective and to minimize a quantitative long-term average of payoffs (aka. mean payoff). The game is zero-sum and hence the aim of the other…

We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can be queried to obtain…

Empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) is primarily focused on learning the equilibria of simulation-based games. Recent approaches have tackled this problem by learning a uniform approximation of the game's utilities, and then applying…

This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…

We consider simple stochastic games $\mathcal G$ with energy-parity objectives, a combination of quantitative rewards with a qualitative parity condition. The Maximizer tries to avoid running out of energy while simultaneously satisfying a…

Two-player games on finite graphs provide a rigorous foundation for modeling the strategic interaction between reactive systems and their environment. While concurrent game semantics naturally capture the synchronous interactions…

Artificially intelligent agents deployed in the real-world will require the ability to reliably \textit{cooperate} with humans (as well as other, heterogeneous AI agents). To provide formal guarantees of successful cooperation, we must make…

This thesis investigates the extent to which the optimal value of a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) can be approximated by some sentence of fixed point logic with counting (FPC). It is known that, assuming $\mathsf{P} \neq…

We consider fixpoint algorithms for two-player games on graphs with $\omega$-regular winning conditions, where the environment is constrained by a strong transition fairness assumption. Strong transition fairness is a widely occurring…

Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…

Many problems in reactive synthesis are stated using two formulas ---an environment assumption and a system guarantee--- and ask for an implementation that satisfies the guarantee in environments that satisfy their assumption. Reactive…

Prior work has studied the computational complexity of computing optimal strategies to commit to in Stackelberg or leadership games, where a leader commits to a strategy which is observed by one or more followers. We extend this setting to…

We extend the quantitative synthesis framework by going beyond the worst-case. On the one hand, classical analysis of two-player games involves an adversary (modeling the environment of the system) which is purely antagonistic and asks for…

We introduce a formal notion of masking fault-tolerance between probabilistic transition systems using stochastic games. These games are inspired in bisimulation games, but they also take into account the possible faulty behavior of…

In many multiagent environments, a designer has some, but limited control over the game being played. In this paper, we formalize this by considering incompletely specified games, in which some entries of the payoff matrices can be chosen…

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…

Learning problems commonly exhibit an interesting feedback mechanism wherein the population data reacts to competing decision makers' actions. This paper formulates a new game theoretic framework for this phenomenon, called "multi-player…