Related papers: Generalizing Impermanent Loss on Decentralized Exc…
Automated market makers with concentrated liquidity capabilities are programmable at the tick level. The maximization of earned fees, plus depreciated reserves, is a convex optimization problem whose vector solution gives the best provision…
Automated Market Makers (AMMs) hold assets and are constantly being rebalanced by external arbitrageurs to match external market prices. Loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) is a pivotal metric for measuring how an AMM pool performs for its…
Automated market makers (AMMs) are a new type of trading venues which are revolutionising the way market participants interact. At present, the majority of AMMs are constant function market makers (CFMMs) where a deterministic trading…
Constant function market makers(CFMMS) are a popular market design for decentralized exchanges(DEX). Liquidity providers(LPs) supply the CFMMs with assets to enable trades. In exchange for providing this liquidity, an LP receives a token…
Decentralised exchanges (DEXs) have transformed trading by enabling trustless, permissionless transactions, yet they face significant challenges such as impermanent loss and slippage, which undermine profitability for liquidity providers…
Although modern blockchains almost universally produce blocks at fixed intervals, existing models still lack an analytical formula for the loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) incurred by Automated Market Makers (AMMs) liquidity providers in this…
The growing share of proactive actors in the electricity markets calls for more attention on prosumers and more support for their decision-making under decentralized electricity markets. In view of the changing paradigm, it is crucial to…
This paper compares mathematical models for automated market makers including logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR), liquidity sensitive LMSR (LS-LMSR), constant product/mean/sum, and others. It is shown that though LMSR may not be a good…
We study decentralized markets for goods whose utility perishes in time, with compute as a primary motivation. Recent advances in reproducible and verifiable execution allow jobs to pause, verify, and resume across heterogeneous hardware,…
Liquidity providers (LPs) are essential figures in the operation of automated market makers (AMMs); in exchange for transaction fees, LPs lend the liquidity that allows AMMs to operate. While many prior works have studied the incentive…
Liquidation of collateral are the primary safeguard for solvency of lending protocols in decentralized finance. However, the mechanics of liquidations expose these protocols to predatory price manipulations and other forms of Maximal…
This paper examines the relationship between impermanent loss (IL) and loss-versus-rebalancing (LVR) in automated market makers (AMMs). Our main focus is on statistical properties, the impact of fees, the role of block times, and, related…
This paper introduces and analyzes \emph{defensive rebalancing}, a novel mechanism for protecting constant-function market makers (CFMMs) from value leakage due to arbitrage. A \emph{rebalancing} transfers assets directly from one CFMM's…
Decentralized Exchanges (DEXs) are one of the most important infrastructures in the world of Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and are generally considered more reliable than centralized exchanges (CEXs). However, some well-known decentralized…
We consider a class of generalized capital asset pricing models in continuous time with a finite number of agents and tradable securities. The securities may not be sufficient to span all sources of uncertainty. If the agents have…
Liquidity providers (LPs) on decentralized exchanges (DEXs) can protect themselves from adverse selection risk by updating their positions more frequently. However, repositioning is costly, because LPs have to pay gas fees for each update.…
Automated market makers (AMMs) allocate fee revenue \textit{proportional} to the amount of liquidity investors deposit. In this paper, we study the economic consequences of the competition between passive liquidity providers (LPs) caused by…
We study Just-in-time (JIT) liquidity provision in blockchain-based decentralized exchanges. A JIT liquidity provider (LP) monitors pending swap orders in public mempools of blockchains to sandwich orders of their choice with liquidity,…
An automated market maker (AMM) is a state machine that manages pools of assets, allowing parties to buy and sell those assets according to a fixed mathematical formula. AMMs are typically implemented as smart contracts on blockchains, and…
Assuming that the price in a Uniswap v3 style Automated Market Maker (AMM) follows a Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM), we prove that the strategy that adjusts the position of liquidity to track the current price leads to a deterministic and…