Related papers: Constrained Serial Dictatorships can be Fair
Prior work studies the question of ``fairly'' ordering transactions in a replicated state machine. Each of $n$ replicas receives transactions in a possibly different order, and the system must aggregate the observed orderings into a single…
We consider a decision maker who must choose an action in order to maximize a reward function that depends also on an unknown parameter {\Theta}. The decision maker can delay taking the action in order to experiment and gather additional…
We revisit the problem of designing strategyproof mechanisms for allocating divisible items among two agents who have linear utilities, where payments are disallowed and there is no prior information on the agents' preferences. The…
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism…
In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
Consider a setting in which a policy maker assigns subjects to treatments, observing each outcome before the next subject arrives. Initially, it is unknown which treatment is best, but the sequential nature of the problem permits learning…
Online learning in a two-sided matching market, with demand side agents continuously competing to be matched with supply side (arms), abstracts the complex interactions under partial information on matching platforms (e.g. UpWork,…
We study the problem of selection in the context of Bayesian persuasion. We are given multiple agents with hidden values (or quality scores), to whom resources must be allocated by a welfare-maximizing decision-maker. An intermediary with…
New fairness notions aligned with the merit principle are proposed for designing exchange rules. We show that for an obviously strategy-proof, efficient and individually rational rule, (i) an agent receives her favorite object when others…
Motivated by applications where impatience is pervasive and evaluation times are uncertain, we study a selection model where options may expire at an unknown point in time and evaluation times are stochastic. Initially, the decision-maker…
The way that people make choices or exhibit preferences can be strongly affected by the set of available alternatives, often called the choice set. Furthermore, there are usually heterogeneous preferences, either at an individual level…
Inspired by real-world applications such as the assignment of pupils to schools or the allocation of social housing, the one-sided matching problem studies how a set of agents can be assigned to a set of objects when the agents have…
We investigate whether preferences for objects received via a matching mechanism are influenced by how highly agents rank them in their reported rank order list. We hypothesize that all else equal, agents receive greater utility for the…
We consider the task of allocating indivisible items to agents, when the agents' preferences over the items are identical. The preferences are captured by means of a directed acyclic graph, with vertices representing items and an edge…
The Assignment problem is a fundamental and well-studied problem in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In the Assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a set of items,…
This paper addresses the problem of sequential submodular maximization: selecting and ranking items in a sequence to optimize some composite submodular function. In contrast to most of the previous works, which assume access to the utility…
We determine the quality of randomized social choice mechanisms in a setting in which the agents have metric preferences: every agent has a cost for each alternative, and these costs form a metric. We assume that these costs are unknown to…
Due to numerous applications in retail and (online) advertising the problem of assortment selection has been widely studied under many combinations of discrete choice models and feasibility constraints. In many situations, however, an…
Sequence optimization, where the items in a list are ordered to maximize some reward has many applications such as web advertisement placement, search, and control libraries in robotics. Previous work in sequence optimization produces a…