Related papers: Learning Near-Optimal Intrusion Responses Against …
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as an optimal stopping game and let attack and defense strategies evolve…
We study automated intrusion response for an IT infrastructure and formulate the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a partially observed stochastic game. To solve the game we follow an approach where attack and defense…
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. Following a novel approach, we formulate the problem of intrusion prevention as an (optimal) multiple stopping problem. This formulation gives us insight into the…
We study automated intrusion prevention using reinforcement learning. In a novel approach, we formulate the problem of intrusion prevention as an optimal stopping problem. This formulation allows us insight into the structure of the optimal…
We present a method to automatically find security strategies for the use case of intrusion prevention. Following this method, we model the interaction between an attacker and a defender as a Markov game and let attack and defense…
In this work, we model Moving Target Defence (MTD) as a partially observable stochastic game between an attacker and a defender. The attacker tries to compromise the system through probing actions, while the defender minimizes the risk by…
Self-play reinforcement learning has demonstrated significant success in learning complex strategic and interactive behaviors in competitive multi-agent games. However, achieving such behaviors in continuous decision spaces remains…
Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) have recently emerged as a significant security challenge for a cyber-physical system due to their stealthy, dynamic and adaptive nature. Proactive dynamic defenses provide a strategic and holistic…
This paper considers the problem of designing optimal algorithms for reinforcement learning in two-player zero-sum games. We focus on self-play algorithms which learn the optimal policy by playing against itself without any direct…
In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…
To ensure the usefulness of Reinforcement Learning (RL) in real systems, it is crucial to ensure they are robust to noise and adversarial attacks. In adversarial RL, an external attacker has the power to manipulate the victim agent's…
Research in adversarial learning follows a cat and mouse game between attackers and defenders where attacks are proposed, they are mitigated by new defenses, and subsequently new attacks are proposed that break earlier defenses, and so on.…
As large language models grow increasingly capable, concerns about their safe deployment have intensified. While numerous alignment strategies aim to restrict harmful behavior, these defenses can still be circumvented through carefully…
Stochastic differential games have been used extensively to model agents' competitions in Finance, for instance, in P2P lending platforms from the Fintech industry, the banking system for systemic risk, and insurance markets. The recently…
A model of strategy formulation is used to study how an adaptive attacker learns to overcome a moving target cyber defense. The attacker-defender interaction is modeled as a game in which a defender deploys a temporal platform migration…
The results of a learning process depend on the input data. There are cases in which an adversary can strategically tamper with the input data to affect the outcome of the learning process. While some datasets are difficult to attack, many…
We study a variant of pursuit-evasion game in the context of perimeter defense. In this problem, the intruder aims to reach the base plane of a hemisphere without being captured by the defender, while the defender tries to capture the…
We consider a game in which a strategic defender classifies an intruder as spy or spammer. The classification is based on the number of file server and mail server attacks observed during a fixed window. The spammer naively attacks (with a…
In this paper, we apply the idea of fictitious play to design deep neural networks (DNNs), and develop deep learning theory and algorithms for computing the Nash equilibrium of asymmetric $N$-player non-zero-sum stochastic differential…
The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…