Related papers: Envy-free dynamic pricing schemes
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…
We introduce a dynamic mechanism design problem in which the designer wants to offer for sale an item to an agent, and another item to the same agent at some point in the future. The agent's joint distribution of valuations for the two…
Envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) is a well-studied fairness notion for indivisible goods that addresses pairwise envy by the removal of at most one good. In the worst case, each pair of agents might require the (hypothetical) removal of a…
We study the power and limits of optimal dynamic pricing in combinatorial markets; i.e., dynamic pricing that leads to optimal social welfare. Previous work by Cohen-Addad et al. [EC'16] demonstrated the existence of optimal dynamic prices…
We study fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. We obtain novel approximation guarantees for three of the strongest fairness notions in discrete fair division, namely envy-free up to the removal of any…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…
In this work, we revisit the problem of fairly allocating a number of indivisible items that are located on a line to multiple agents. A feasible allocation requires that the allocated items to each agent are connected on the line. The…
We study the problem of fair rent division that entails splitting the rent and allocating the rooms of an apartment among roommates (agents) in a fair manner. In this setup, a distribution of the rent and an allocation is said to be fair if…
We consider the use of pricing as a regulatory mechanism when an unknown number of autonomous agents compete for access to a shared resource (possibly limited in volume or capacity). In standard dynamic pricing control systems, an…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
Price discrimination, which refers to the strategy of setting different prices for different customer groups, has been widely used in online retailing. Although it helps boost the collected revenue for online retailers, it might create…
Bike-sharing systems are emerging in various cities as a new ecofriendly transportation system. In these systems, spatiotemporally varying user demands lead to imbalanced inventory at bicycle stations, resulting in additional relocation…
Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the…
We here address the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods or chores to $n$ agents with weights that define their entitlement to the set of indivisible resources. Stemming from well-studied fairness concepts such as envy-freeness up…
Recommender systems play an increasingly crucial role in shaping people's opportunities, particularly in online dating platforms. It is essential from the user's perspective to increase the probability of matching with a suitable partner…
When allocating indivisible items, there are various ways to use monetary transfers for eliminating envy. Particularly, one can apply a balanced vector of transfer payments, or charge each agent a positive amount, or -- contrarily -- give…
We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-closed and symmetric feasibility constraint on the probabilities…
We study a combinatorial market design problem, where a collection of indivisible objects is to be priced and sold to potential buyers subject to equilibrium constraints.The classic solution concept for such problems is Walrasian…