Related papers: Efficient Market Design with Distributional Object…
We study the optimal asset allocation problem for a fund manager whose compensation depends on the performance of her portfolio with respect to a benchmark. The objective of the manager is to maximise the expected utility of her final…
We consider distributed convex optimization problems that involve a separable objective function and nontrivial functional constraints, such as Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs). We propose a decentralized and computationally inexpensive…
We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism-selection games in which the designer can only commit to short-term mechanisms. We identify a canonical class of mechanisms rich enough to replicate the outcomes of…
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show…
The problem of allocating scarce items to individuals is an important practical question in market design. An increasingly popular set of mechanisms for this task uses the concept of market equilibrium: individuals report their preferences,…
In the contest design problem, there are $n$ strategic contestants, each of whom decides an effort level. A contest designer with a fixed budget must then design a mechanism that allocates a prize $p_i$ to the $i$-th rank based on the…
We provide a unifying framework for distributed convex optimization over time-varying networks, in the presence of constraints and uncertainty, features that are typically treated separately in the literature. We adopt a proximal…
When a distributed algorithm must be executed by strategic agents with misaligned interests, a social leader needs to introduce an appropriate tax/subsidy mechanism to incentivize agents to faithfully implement the intended algorithm so…
In this paper, we consider distributed optimization problems over a multi-agent network, where each agent can only partially evaluate the objective function, and it is allowed to exchange messages with its immediate neighbors. Differently…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
The classic fair division problems assume the resources to be allocated are either divisible or indivisible, or contain a mixture of both, but the agents always have a predetermined and uncontroversial agreement on the (in)divisibility of…
Dispersion is a fundamental concept in statistics, yet standard approaches - especially via stochastic orders - face limitations in the discrete setting. In particular, the classical dispersive order, well-established for continuous…
The assignment of tasks to multiple resources becomes an interesting game theoretic problem, when both the task owner and the resources are strategic. In the classical, nonstrategic setting, where the states of the tasks and resources are…
Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among…
We study the problem of designing truthful and fair mechanisms when allocating a mixture of divisible and indivisible goods. We first show that there does not exist an EFM (envy-free for mixed goods) and truthful mechanism in general. This…
We propose Discrete Consensus-Based Optimization (DCBO), a fully discrete version of the Consensus-Based Optimization (CBO) framework. DCBO is a multi-agent method for the global optimization of possibly non-convex and non-differentiable…
Experiments in predator-prey systems show the emergence of long-term cycles. Deterministic model typically fails in capturing these behaviors, which emerge from the microscopic interplay of individual based dynamics and stochastic effects.…
We study the problem of allocating homogeneous and indivisible objects among agents with money. In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and…
This work explores a novel perspective on solving nonconvex and nonsmooth optimization problems by leveraging sampling based methods. Instead of treating the objective function purely through traditional (often deterministic) optimization…
Dynamic mechanism design is a challenging extension to ordinary mechanism design in which the mechanism designer must make a sequence of decisions over time in the face of possibly untruthful reports of participating agents. Optimizing…