Related papers: Efficient Market Design with Distributional Object…
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against…
Distributed estimation that recruits potentially large groups of humans to collect data about a phenomenon of interest has emerged as a paradigm applicable to a broad range of detection and estimation tasks. However, it also presents a…
We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…
Differentially private mechanisms are increasingly used to publish tables of counts, where each entry represents the number of individuals belonging to a particular category. A distribution of counts summarizes the information in the count…
This paper studies the distributed optimization problem when the objective functions might be nondifferentiable and subject to heterogeneous set constraints. Unlike existing subgradient methods, we focus on the case when the exact…
This paper introduces a novel concept for addressing non-convexity in the cost functions of distributed economic model predictive control (DEMPC) systems. Specifically, the proposed algorithm enables agents to self-organize into a hierarchy…
We study the fair division problem on divisible heterogeneous resources (the cake cutting problem) with strategic agents, where each agent can manipulate his/her private valuation in order to receive a better allocation. A…
Submodularity is an important concept in combinatorial optimization, and it is often regarded as a discrete analog of convexity. It is a fundamental fact that the set of minimizers of any submodular function forms a distributive lattice.…
We consider a general multi-agent convex optimization problem where the agents are to collectively minimize a global objective function subject to a global inequality constraint, a global equality constraint, and a global constraint set.…
Priority-based allocation of individuals to positions are pervasive, and elimination of justified envy is often, an absolute requirement. This leaves serial dictatorship (SD) as the only rule that avoids justified envy under standard direct…
We study the classic mechanism design problem of locating a public facility on a real line. In contrast to previous work, we assume that the agents are unable to fully specify where their preferred location lies, and instead only provide…
This paper presents discrete convex analysis as a tool for economics and game theory. Discrete convex analysis is a new framework of discrete mathematics and optimization, developed during the last two decades. Recently, it is being…
In social decision-making among strategic agents, a universal focus lies on the balance between social and individual interests. Socially efficient mechanisms are thus desirably designed to not only maximize the social welfare but also…
Mechanism design for fully strategic agents commonly assumes broadcast nature of communication between agents of the system. Moreover, for mechanism design, the stability of Nash equilibrium (NE) is demonstrated by showing convergence of…
We study the problem of automated mechanism design with partial verification, where each type can (mis)report only a restricted set of types (rather than any other type), induced by the principal's limited verification power. We prove…
We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…
We introduce a new mechanism for stochastic convex optimization (SCO) with user-level differential privacy guarantees. The convergence rates of this mechanism are similar to those in the prior work of Levy et al. (2021); Narayanan et al.…
We consider a principal who wishes to screen an agent with \emph{discrete} types by offering a menu of \emph{discrete} quantities and \emph{discrete} transfers. We assume that the principal's valuation is discrete strictly concave and use a…
We consider a task of scheduling with a common deadline on a single machine. Every player reports to a scheduler the length of his job and the scheduler needs to finish as many jobs as possible by the deadline. For this simple problem,…
We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…