Related papers: Efficiently Hardening SGX Enclaves against Memory …
Recent studies highlighting the vulnerability of computer architecture to information leakage attacks have been a cause of significant concern. Among the various classes of microarchitectural attacks, cache timing channels are especially…
Power side-channel (PSC) attacks are widely used in embedded microcontrollers, particularly in cryptographic applications, to extract sensitive information. However, expanding the applications of PSC attacks to broader security contexts in…
This paper evaluates new security threats due to the processor frontend in modern Intel processors. The root causes of the security threats are the multiple paths in the processor frontend that the micro-operations can take: through the…
Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
Shared caches are vulnerable to side channel attacks through contention in cache sets. Besides being a simple source of information leak, these side channels form useful gadgets for more sophisticated attacks that compromise the security of…
Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…
In the last two decades, the evolving cyber-threat landscape has brought to center stage the contentious tradeoffs between the security and performance of modern microprocessors. The guarantees provided by the hardware to ensure no…
Timing channels in cache hierarchies are an important enabler in many microarchitectural attacks. ScatterCache (USENIX 2019) is a protected cache architecture that randomizes the address-to-index mapping with a keyed cryptographic function,…
Different from the traditional software vulnerability, the microarchitecture side channel has three characteristics: extensive influence, potent threat, and tough defense. The main reason for the micro-architecture side channel is resource…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gradually adopted by major cloud providers, offering a practical option of \emph{confidential computing} for users who don't fully trust public clouds. TEEs use CPU-enabled hardware features to…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) such as \intelsgx facilitate the secure execution of an application on untrusted machines. Sadly, such environments suffer from serious limitations and performance overheads in terms of writing back…
Fault-injection attacks have been proven in the past to be a reliable way of bypassing hardware-based security measures, such as cryptographic hashes, privilege and access permission enforcement, and trusted execution environments. However,…
Novel hardware-aided trusted execution environments, as provided by Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX), enable to execute applications in a secure context that enforces confidentiality and integrity of the application state even when…
Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…
Now a days, data mining and knowledge discovery methods are applied to a variety of enterprise and engineering disciplines to uncover interesting patterns from databases. The study of Sequential patterns is an important data mining problem…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are hardware-enforced memory isolation units, emerging as a pivotal security solution for security-critical applications. TEEs, like Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, allow the isolation of confidential code…
Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary data from memory. As state-of-the-art software mitigations…
Efficient execution of SPARQL queries over large RDF datasets is a topic of considerable interest due to increased use of RDF to encode data. Most of this work has followed either relational or graph-based approaches. In this paper, we…
Secure speculation schemes have shown great promise in the war against speculative side-channel attacks, and will be a key building block for developing secure, high-performance architectures moving forward. As the field matures, the need…