Related papers: Efficiently Hardening SGX Enclaves against Memory …
Hardware-supported security mechanisms like Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) provide strong security guarantees, which are particularly relevant in cloud settings. However, their reliance on physical hardware conflicts with cloud…
The widening availability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) has been accelerating the adaptation of new applications using TEEs. Recent studies showed that a cloud application consists of multiple distributed software…
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for maximum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where timing differences in shared cache behavior are exploited to…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gaining popularity as an effective means to provide confidentiality in the cloud. TEEs, such as Intel SGX, suffer from so-called rollback and cloning attacks (often referred to as forking attacks).…
Hardware-enclaves that target complex CPU designs compromise both security and performance. Programs have little control over micro-architecture, which leads to side-channel leaks, and then have to be transformed to have worst-case control-…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
FPGA-based hardware accelerators are becoming increasingly popular due to their versatility, customizability, energy efficiency, constant latency, and scalability. FPGAs can be tailored to specific algorithms, enabling efficient hardware…
Modern CPU architectures offer strong isolation guarantees towards user applications in the form of enclaves. For instance, Intel's threat model for SGX assumes fully trusted enclaves, yet there is an ongoing debate on whether this threat…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…
User programs recover from hardware exceptions and respond to signals by executing custom handlers that they register specifically for such events. We present SIGY attack, which abuses this programming model on Intel SGX to break the…
Encrypted database systems provide a great method for protecting sensitive data in untrusted infrastructures. These systems are built using either special-purpose cryptographic algorithms that support operations over encrypted data, or by…
Machine learning has become a critical component of modern data-driven online services. Typically, the training phase of machine learning techniques requires to process large-scale datasets which may contain private and sensitive…
Although cloud computing offers many advantages with regards to adaption of resources, we witness either a strong resistance or a very slow adoption to those new offerings. One reason for the resistance is that (i) many technologies such as…
A promising approach for designing critical embedded systems is based on virtualization technologies and multi-core platforms. These enable the deployment of both real-time and general-purpose systems with different criticalities in a…
Adversaries with physical access to a target platform can perform cold boot or DMA attacks to extract sensitive data from the RAM. In response, several main-memory encryption schemes have been proposed to prevent such attacks. Also hardware…
We provide an evaluation of an analytical workload in a confidential computing environment, combining DuckDB with two technologies: modular columnar encryption in Parquet files (data at rest) and the newest version of the Intel SGX Trusted…
Over the last two decades, the danger of sharing resources between programs has been repeatedly highlighted. Multiple side-channel attacks, which seek to exploit shared components for leaking information, have been devised, mostly targeting…
Cloud providers are extending support for trusted hardware primitives such as Intel SGX. Simultaneously, the field of deep learning is seeing enormous innovation as well as an increase in adoption. In this paper, we ask a timely question:…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…