Related papers: Adapting to game trees in zero-sum imperfect infor…
Extensive-form games (EFGs) are a common model of multi-agent interactions with imperfect information. State-of-the-art algorithms for solving these games typically perform full walks of the game tree that can prove prohibitively slow in…
Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…
Extensive-form games with imperfect recall are an important game-theoretic model that allows a compact representation of strategies in dynamic strategic interactions. Practical use of imperfect recall games is limited due to negative…
Existing data-driven and feedback traffic control strategies do not consider the heterogeneity of real-time data measurements. Besides, traditional reinforcement learning (RL) methods for traffic control usually converge slowly for lacking…
When learning to play an imperfect information game, it is often easier to first start with the basic mechanics of the game rules. For example, one can play several example rounds with private cards revealed to all players to better…
In this paper, we address the problem of a two-player linear quadratic differential game with incomplete information, a scenario commonly encountered in multi-agent control, human-robot interaction (HRI), and approximation methods for…
Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) learns an optimal policy, given some expert demonstrations, thus avoiding the need for the tedious process of specifying a suitable reward function. However, current methods are constrained by at least…
We analyze best response dynamics for finding a Nash equilibrium of an infinite horizon zero-sum stochastic linear quadratic dynamic game (LQDG) with partial and asymmetric information. We derive explicit expressions for each player's best…
In this paper, we extend the Descent framework, which enables learning and planning in the context of two-player games with perfect information, to the framework of stochastic games. We propose two ways of doing this, the first way…
The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…
Search in test time is often used to improve the performance of reinforcement learning algorithms. Performing theoretically sound search in fully adversarial two-player games with imperfect information is notoriously difficult and requires…
We study finite-horizon two-player zero-sum differential games with one-sided payoff information ($G$), where the informed player (P1) knows the game payoff, while P2 only has a public belief over a finite set of possible payoffs. In this…
Game theory provides the gold standard for analyzing adversarial engagements, offering strong optimality guarantees. However, these guarantees often become brittle when assumptions such as perfect information are violated. Reinforcement…
We study the role of local effects and finite size effects in reaching coordination and in equilibrium selection in different types of two-player coordination games. We investigate three update rules -- the replicator dynamics (RD), the…
We study two-player zero-sum stochastic games, and propose a form of independent learning dynamics called Doubly Smoothed Best-Response dynamics, which integrates a discrete and doubly smoothed variant of the best-response dynamics into…
In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…
Understanding the behavior of no-regret dynamics in general $N$-player games is a fundamental question in online learning and game theory. A folk result in the field states that, in finite games, the empirical frequency of play under…
We consider surveillance-evasion differential games, where a pursuer must try to constantly maintain visibility of a moving evader. The pursuer loses as soon as the evader becomes occluded. Optimal controls for game can be formulated as a…
We introduce an extension of Strategy Logic for the imperfect-information setting, called SLii, and study its model-checking problem. As this logic naturally captures multi-player games with imperfect information, this problem is…
We investigate the strategic surplus obtainable against a Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) learner with constant step size $\eta$ in $n\times m$ two-player zero-sum games played over $T$ rounds against a clairvoyant optimizer. In…