Related papers: Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Infor…

A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…

Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…

We study a disclosure game with a large evidence space. There is an unknown binary state. A sender observes a sequence of binary signals about the state and discloses a left truncation of the sequence to a receiver in order to convince him…

Bayesian rationality in strategic games presumes that it is possible to translate strategic uncertainty into imperfect information. Correlated equilibrium is guided by the idea that players are Bayes rational, have a common prior, and…

Studying games in the complete information model makes them analytically tractable. However, large $n$ player interactions are more realistically modeled as games of incomplete information, where players may know little to nothing about the…

A Bayesian game is said to have nested information if the players are ordered, and each player knows the types of all players that follow her in that order. We prove that all multiplayer Bayesian games with finite actions spaces, bounded…

We study a class of finite-action disclosure games in which the sender's preferences are state-independent and the receiver's optimal action depends only on the expected state. While receiver-preferred equilibria in these games involve full…

This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…

In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize…

We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…

We consider a class of pursuit-evasion differential games in which the evader has continuous access to the pursuer's location, but not vice-versa. There is an immobile sensor (e.g., a ground radar station) that can sense the evader's…

Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…

Large Language Models (LLMs) act as powerful reasoning engines but struggle with "symbol grounding" in embodied environments, particularly when information is asymmetrically distributed. We investigate the Privileged Information Bias (or…

In multi-agent problems requiring a high degree of cooperation, success often depends on the ability of the agents to adapt to each other's behavior. A natural solution concept in such settings is the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the…

Given a bimatrix game, the associated leadership or commitment games are defined as the games at which one player, the leader, commits to a (possibly mixed) strategy and the other player, the follower, chooses his strategy after having…

Information is a critical dimension in warfare. Inaccurate information such as misinformation or disinformation further complicates military operations. In this paper, we examine the value of misinformation and disinformation to a military…

A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information…

Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…

We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…

We consider two-player games with imperfect information and the synthesis of a randomized strategy for one player that ensures the objective is satisfied almost-surely (i.e., with probability 1), regardless of the strategy of the other…