Related papers: Commitment with Signaling under Double-sided Infor…
Among the strategic choices made by today's economic actors are choices about algorithms and computational resources. Different access to computational resources may result in a kind of economic asymmetry analogous to information asymmetry.…
This paper studies a game in which an informed sender with state-independent preferences uses verifiable messages to convince a receiver to choose an action from a finite set. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes of the game and compare…
We investigate quantum games in which the information is asymmetrically distributed among the players, and find the possibility of the quantum game outperforming its classical counterpart depends strongly on not only the entanglement, but…
This paper examines strategic trading under incomplete information, where firms lack full knowledge of key aspects of their competitors' trading strategies such as target sizes and market impact models. We extend previous work on…
We initiate the study of structured Stackelberg games, a novel form of strategic interaction between a leader and a follower where contextual information can be predictive of the follower's (unknown) type. Motivated by applications such as…
In a multi-follower Bayesian Stackelberg game, a leader plays a mixed strategy over $L$ actions to which $n\ge 1$ followers, each having one of $K$ possible private types, best respond. The leader's optimal strategy depends on the…
We consider the problem of dynamic information design with one sender and one receiver where the sender observers a private state of the system and takes an action to send a signal based on its observation to a receiver. Based on this…
This paper introduces the new concept of (follower) satisfaction in Stackelberg games and compares the standard Stackelberg game with its satisfaction version. Simulation results are presented which suggest that the follower adopting…
This paper analyzes the fundamental limits of strate- gic communication in network settings. Strategic communication differs from the conventional communication paradigms in in- formation theory since it involves different objectives for…
This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…
In this paper, we investigate the existence and characterization of the value for a two-player zero-sum differential game with symmetric incomplete information on a continuum of initial positions and with signal revelation. Before the game…
In the classical communication setting multiple senders having access to the same source of information and transmitting it over channel(s) to a receiver in general leads to a decrease in estimation error at the receiver as compared with…
To take advantage of strategy commitment, a useful tactic of playing games, a leader must learn enough information about the follower's payoff function. However, this leaves the follower a chance to provide fake information and influence…
Incentive design deals with interaction between a principal and an agent where the former can shape the latter's utility through a policy commitment. It is well known that the principal faces an information rent when dealing with an agent…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
We study the role of costly information in non-cooperative two-player games when an extrinsic third party information broker is introduced asymmetrically, allowing one player to obtain information about the other player's action. This…
This study provides a model of cyber deception with asymmetric recognition represented by private beliefs. Signaling games, which are often used in existing works, are built on the implicit premise that the receiver's belief is public…
Nowadays, mobile users have a vast number of applications and services at their disposal. Each of these might impose some privacy threats on users' "Personally Identifiable Information" (PII). Location privacy is a crucial part of PII, and…
This paper is concerned with a Stackelberg stochastic differential game with asymmetric noisy observation, with one follower and one leader. In our model, the follower cannot observe the state process directly, but could observe a noisy…
In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender's commitment to a predetermined information…