Related papers: Mechanism Design With Predictions for Obnoxious Fa…
We address the problem of distributed cooperative localization in wireless networks, i.e. nodes without prior position knowledge (agents) wish to determine their own positions. In non-cooperative approaches, positioning is only based on…
A system relying on the collective behavior of decision-makers can be vulnerable to a variety of adversarial attacks. How well can a system operator protect performance in the face of these risks? We frame this question in the context of…
We investigate optimality conditions for optimization problems constrained by a class of variational inequalities of the second kind. Based on a nonsmooth primal-dual reformulation of the governing inequality, the differentiability of the…
We investigate a method to deal with congestion of sectors and delays in the tactical phase of air traffic flow and capacity management. It relies on temporal objectives given for every point of the flight plans and shared among the…
Uncertain dynamic obstacles, such as pedestrians or vehicles, pose a major challenge for optimal robot navigation with safety guarantees. Previous work on motion planning has followed two main strategies to provide a safe bound on an…
Stochastic multi-agent systems are a central modeling framework for autonomous controllers, communication protocols, and cyber-physical infrastructures. In many such systems, however, transition probabilities are only estimated from data…
We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility…
We consider mechanisms for markets that are double-sided and have players with multi-dimensional strategic spaces on at least one side. The players of the market are strategic, and act to optimize their own utilities. The mechanism…
This paper explores the Mechanism Design aspects of the $m$-Capacitated Facility Location Problem where the total facility capacity is less than the number of agents. Following the framework outlined by Aziz et al., the Social Welfare of…
A principal must decide between two options. Which one she prefers depends on the private information of two agents. One agent always prefers the first option; the other always prefers the second. Transfers are infeasible. One application…
We study Bayesian mechanism design problems in settings where agents have budgets. Specifically, an agent's utility for an outcome is given by his value for the outcome minus any payment he makes to the mechanism, as long as the payment is…
We study a sequence of independent one-shot non-cooperative games where agents play equilibria determined by a tunable mechanism. Observing only equilibrium decisions, without parametric or distributional knowledge of utilities, we aim to…
We consider the robust contract design problem when the principal only has limited information about the actions the agent can take. The principal evaluates a contract according to its worst-case performance caused by the uncertain action…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
Our aim is to design mechanisms that motivate all agents to reveal their predictions truthfully and promptly. For myopic agents, proper scoring rules induce truthfulness. However, as has been described in the literature, when agents take…
We consider the geo-indistinguishability approach to location privacy, and the trade-off with respect to utility. We show that, given a desired degree of geo-indistinguishability, it is possible to construct a mechanism that minimizes the…
We consider the stochastic geometry model where the location of each node is a random point in a given metric space, or the existence of each node is uncertain. We study the problems of computing the expected lengths of several…
A principal must allocate a set of heterogeneous tasks (or objects) among multiple agents. The principal has preferences over the allocation. Each agent has preferences over which tasks they are assigned, which are their private…
Humans perform exquisite sensorimotor skills, both individually and in teams, from athletes performing rhythmic gymnastics to everyday tasks like carrying a cup of coffee. The "predictive brain" framework suggests that mastering these…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…