Related papers: Closed-Loop Stackelberg Strategy for Linear-Quadra…
This paper proposes and studies a class of discrete-time finite-time-horizon Stackelberg mean-field games, with one leader and an infinite number of identical and indistinguishable followers. In this game, the objective of the leader is to…
We investigate a co-design problem, encompassing simultaneous design of system infrastructure and control, through a game-theoretical framework. To this end, we propose the co-design problem as a two-layer hierarchical strategic…
In this paper,we mainly focus on the numerical solution of high-dimensional stochastic optimal control problem driven by fully-coupled forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs in short) through deep learning. We first…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
We study unconstrained and constrained linear quadratic problems and investigate the suboptimality of the model predictive control (MPC) method applied to such problems. Considering MPC as an approximate scheme for solving the related fixed…
This paper is about a set-based computing method for solving a general class of two-player zero-sum Stackelberg differential games. We assume that the game is modeled by a set of coupled nonlinear differential equations, which can be…
In this work, we propose the first fully first-order method to compute an epsilon stationary Stackelberg equilibrium with convergence guarantees. To achieve this, we first reframe the leader follower interaction as single level constrained…
Previous research has shown that federated learning (FL) systems are exposed to an array of security risks. Despite the proposal of several defensive strategies, they tend to be non-adaptive and specific to certain types of attacks,…
Most models of Stackelberg security games assume that the attacker only knows the defender's mixed strategy, but is not able to observe (even partially) the instantiated pure strategy. Such partial observation of the deployed pure strategy…
This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the…
This paper studies a linear-quadratic mean-field game of stochastic large-population system, where the large-population system satisfies a class of $N$ weakly coupled linear backward stochastic differential equation. Different from the…
Robust Reinforcement Learning (RL) focuses on improving performances under model errors or adversarial attacks, which facilitates the real-life deployment of RL agents. Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) is one of the most…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
We study the time-inconsistent linear quadratic optimal control problem for forward-backward stochastic differential equations with potentially indefinite cost weighting matrices for both the state and the control variables. Our research…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
It is shown in recent studies that in a Stackelberg game the follower can manipulate the leader by deviating from their true best-response behavior. Such manipulations are computationally tractable and can be highly beneficial for the…
This paper is concerned with a stochastic linear-quadratic optimal control problem in a finite time horizon, where the coefficients of the control system are allowed to be random, and the weighting matrices in the cost functional are…
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic feedback terminal guidance law for an autonomous, unpowered hypersonic pursuit vehicle that seeks to intercept an evading ground target whose motion is constrained in a one-dimensional space. We…