Related papers: Closed-Loop Stackelberg Strategy for Linear-Quadra…
The paper is concerned with two-person zero-sum mean-field linear-quadratic stochastic differential games over finite horizons. By a Hilbert space method, a necessary condition and a sufficient condition are derived for the existence of an…
Motivated by a product pricing problem, a linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game for a regime switching system involving one leader and two followers is studied. The two followers engage in a zero-sum differential game, and both the…
This paper investigates a zero-sum stochastic linear-quadratic (SLQ, for short) Stackelberg differential game problem, where the coefficients of the state equation and the weighting matrices in the performance functional are regulated by a…
In this paper, the open-loop, closed-loop, and weak closed-loop solvability for discrete-time linear-quadratic (LQ) control problem is considered due to the fact that it is always open-loop optimal solvable if the LQ control problem is…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
In this paper, the solvability of discrete-time stochastic linear-quadratic (LQ) optimal control problem in finite horizon is considered. Firstly, it shows that the closed-loop solvability for the LQ control problem is optimal if and only…
Solving feedback Stackelberg games with nonlinear dynamics and coupled constraints, a common scenario in practice, presents significant challenges. This work introduces an efficient method for computing approximate local feedback…
Stackelberg games are a classic example of bilevel optimization problems, which are often encountered in game theory and economics. These are complex problems with a hierarchical structure, where one optimization task is nested within the…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
We present a linear--quadratic Stackelberg game with a large number of followers and we also derive the mean field limit of infinitely many followers. The relation between optimization and mean-field limit is studied and conditions for…
This paper is concerned with a three-level stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric information, in which three players participate credited as Player 1, Player 2 and Player 3. Player 3 acts as the leader of…
The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed mean field Stackelberg stochastic differential game, which contains a leader and a large number of followers. Specifically, the followers confront a large-population Nash…
We study a continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg game in which a leader seeks to accomplish a primary objective while inferring a hidden parameter of a rational follower. The follower solves an entropy-regularized tracking problem and…
We propose a two-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a local solution to the Stackelberg equilibrium problem in aggregative games with coupling constraints. Specifically, we focus on a single-leader, multiple-follower problem,…
We extend the formalism of Conjectural Variations games to Stackelberg games involving multiple leaders and a single follower. To solve these nonconvex games, a common assumption is that the leaders compute their strategies having perfect…
The multilevel reverse Stackelberg game is considered. In this game, the leader controls the outcome by announcing a strategy as a function of decision variables of the followers to his/her own decision space. Corresponding to the leader's…
We study online learning in Bayesian Stackelberg games, where a leader repeatedly interacts with a follower whose unknown private type is independently drawn at each round from an unknown probability distribution. The goal is to design…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
The paper presents a new method for approximating Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in general-sum sequential games with imperfect information and perfect recall. The proposed approach is generic as it does not rely on any specific properties…