Related papers: Evolutionary games on multilayer networks: coordin…
Decision-making individuals are often considered to be either imitators who copy the action of their most successful neighbors or best-responders who maximize their benefit against the current actions of their neighbors. In the context of…
We study an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with two layered graphs, where the lower layer is the physical infrastructure on which the interactions are taking place and the upper layer represents the connections for the strategy…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
Networks form the backbone of many complex systems, ranging from the Internet to human societies. Accordingly, not only is the range of our interactions limited and thus best described and modeled by networks, it is also a fact that the…
Evolutionary game theory is a common framework to study the evolution of cooperation, where it is usually assumed that the same game is played in all interactions. Here, we investigate a model where the game that is played by two…
In evolutionary game theory, repeated two-player games are used to study strategy evolution in a population under natural selection. As the evolution greatly depends on the interaction structure, there has been growing interests in studying…
This work explores three-player game training dynamics, under what conditions three-player games converge and the equilibria the converge on. In contrast to prior work, we examine a three-player game architecture in which all players…
Innovation and evolution are two processes of paramount relevance for social and biological systems. In general, the former allows to introduce elements of novelty, while the latter is responsible for the motion of a system in its phase…
We study the evolution of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game, whereby a coevolutionary rule is introduced that molds the random topology of the interaction network in two ways. First, existing links are deleted whenever a player…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
Imitation is widely observed in populations of decision-making agents. Using our recent convergence results for asynchronous imitation dynamics on networks, we consider how such networks can be efficiently driven to a desired equilibrium…
We discuss stochastic dynamics of populations of individuals playing games. Our models possess two evolutionarily stable strategies: an efficient one, where a population is in a state with the maximal payoff (fitness) and a risk-dominant…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
The phenomenon of group cooperation constitutes a fundamental mechanism underlying various social and biological systems. Complex networks provide a structural framework for group interactions, where individuals can not only obtain…
We live and cooperate in networks. However, links in networks only allow for pairwise interactions, thus making the framework suitable for dyadic games, but not for games that are played in groups of more than two players. Here, we study…
A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…