Related papers: Matching with Incomplete Preferences
We study the problem of matching agents who arrive at a marketplace over time and leave after d time periods. Agents can only be matched while they are present in the marketplace. Each pair of agents can yield a different match value, and…
Given $n$ men, $n$ women, and $n$ dogs, each man has an incomplete preference list of women, each woman does an incomplete preference list of dogs, and each dog does an incomplete preference list of men. We understand a family as a triple…
Consider the object allocation (one-sided matching) model of Shapley and Scarf (1974). When final allocations are observed but agents' preferences are unknown, when might the allocation be in the core? This is a one-sided analogue of the…
We study the problem of agent-based negotiation in combinatorial domains. It is difficult to reach optimal agreements in bilateral or multi-lateral negotiations when the agents' preferences for the possible alternatives are not common…
Matching markets are often organized in a multi-stage and decentralized manner. Moreover, participants in real-world matching markets often have uncertain preferences. This article develops a framework for learning optimal strategies in…
This paper studies the relationship between core and competitive equilibira in economies that consist of a continuum of agents and some large agents. We construct a class of these economies in which the core and competitive allocations do…
We study a variation of the Stable Marriage problem, where every man and every woman express their preferences as preference lists which may be incomplete and contain ties. This problem is called the Stable Marriage problem with Ties and…
We study the problem of pure exploration in matching markets under uncertain preferences, where the goal is to identify a stable matching with confidence parameter $\delta$ and minimal sample complexity. Agents learn preferences via…
We study one-sided matchings with endowments in the absence of money. It is well-known that a competitive equilibrium may not always exist and that the strong core may be empty in this setting [Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979]. We propose a…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions are popular auction designs that constrain prices to eliminate the incentive for any group of bidders -- with the seller -- to renegotiate for a better deal. They help overcome the low-revenue issues of…
In rational verification, the aim is to verify which temporal logic properties will obtain in a multi-agent system, under the assumption that agents ("players") in the system choose strategies for acting that form a game theoretic…
Hedonic games provide a general model of coalition formation, in which a set of agents is partitioned into coalitions, with each agent having preferences over which other players are in her coalition. We prove that with additively separable…
In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the different alternatives in the form of linear orderings. While this clearly simplifies preference elicitation, it inevitably leads to poor…
In robust optimization one seeks to make a decision under uncertainty, where the goal is to find the solution with the best worst-case performance. The set of possible realizations of the uncertain data is described by a so-called…
We give parallel and distributed algorithms for the housing allocation problem. In this problem, there is a set of agents and a set of houses. Each agent has a strict preference list for a subset of houses. We need to find a matching such…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
Applications such as employees sharing office spaces over a workweek can be modeled as problems where agents are matched to resources over multiple rounds. Agents' requirements limit the set of compatible resources and the rounds in which…
Bipartite matching, where agents on one side of a market are matched to agents or items on the other, is a classical problem in computer science and economics, with widespread application in healthcare, education, advertising, and general…
The accurate applicant selection for university education is imperative to ensure fairness and optimal use of institutional resources. Although various approaches are operational in tertiary educational institutions for selecting…