Related papers: Matching with Incomplete Preferences
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise…
We consider a variant of socially stable marriage problem where preference lists may be incomplete, may contain ties and may have bounded length. In real world application like NRMP and Scottish medical matching scheme such restrictions…
We study the problem of repeated two-sided matching with uncertain preferences (two-sided bandits), and no explicit communication between agents. Recent work has developed algorithms that converge to stable matchings when one side (the…
This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Core stability is a natural and well-studied notion for group fairness in multi-winner voting, where the task is to select a committee from a pool of candidates. We study the setting where voters either approve or disapprove of each…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the…
We study the implementability of stable matchings in a two-sided market model with one-sided incomplete information. Firms' types are publicly known, whereas workers' types are private information. A mechanism generates a matching and…
In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the…
Some aspects of the problem of stable marriage are discussed. There are two distinguished marriage plans: the fully transferable case, where money can be transferred between the participants, and the fully non transferable case where each…
We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We…
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, an online platform matches the agents, and obtains a noisy…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from…
Two-sided matching markets, environments in which two disjoint groups of agents seek to partner with one another, arise in several contexts. In static, centralized markets where agents know their preferences, standard algorithms can yield a…
The stable marriage problem and its extensions have been extensively studied, with much of the work in the literature assuming that agents fully know their own preferences over alternatives. This assumption however is not always practical…
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing markets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize…
We study the classical, two-sided stable marriage problem under pairwise preferences. In the most general setting, agents are allowed to express their preferences as comparisons of any two of their edges and they also have the right to…