Related papers: Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions?
Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…
This paper considers the problem of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in aggregative games, where the payoff function of each player depends on an aggregate of all players' actions. We present a distributed continuous time algorithm such that…
A mediator observes no-regret learners playing an extensive-form game repeatedly across $T$ rounds. The mediator attempts to steer players toward some desirable predetermined equilibrium by giving (nonnegative) payments to players. We call…
We consider the problem of learning to exploit learning algorithms through repeated interactions in games. Specifically, we focus on the case of repeated two player, finite-action games, in which an optimizer aims to steer a no-regret…
We introduce one-way games, a framework motivated by applications in large-scale power restoration, humanitarian logistics, and integrated supply-chains. The distinguishable feature of the games is that the payoff of some player is…
We investigate the difficulty of finding economically efficient solutions to coordination problems on graphs. Our work focuses on two forms of coordination problem: pure-coordination games and anti-coordination games. We consider three…
While game-theoretic planning frameworks are effective at modeling multi-agent interactions, they require solving large optimization problems where the number of variables increases with the number of agents, resulting in long computation…
There have been two major lines of research aimed at capturing resource-bounded players in game theory. The first, initiated by Rubinstein, charges an agent for doing costly computation; the second, initiated by Neyman, does not charge for…
In addressing the challenge of exponential scaling with the number of agents we adopt a cluster-based representation to approximately solve asymmetric games of very many players. A cluster groups together agents with a similar "strategic…
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on…
Modern board games are a rich source of entertainment for many people, but also contain interesting and challenging structures for game playing research and implementing game playing agents. This paper studies the game Patchwork, a two…
We address the problem of mechanism design for two-stage repeated stochastic games -- a novel setting using which many emerging problems in next-generation electricity markets can be readily modeled. Repeated playing affords the players a…
In this paper we study the complexity of strategic argumentation for dialogue games. A dialogue game is a 2-player game where the parties play arguments. We show how to model dialogue games in a skeptical, non-monotonic formalism, and we…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
Several problems in planning and reactive synthesis can be reduced to the analysis of two-player quantitative graph games. {\em Optimization} is one form of analysis. We argue that in many cases it may be better to replace the optimization…
We consider turn-based stochastic two-player games with a combination of a parity condition that must hold surely, that is in all possible outcomes, and of a parity condition that must hold almost-surely, that is with probability 1. The…
We consider two-stage robust optimization problems, which can be seen as games between a decision maker and an adversary. After the decision maker fixes part of the solution, the adversary chooses a scenario from a specified uncertainty…
In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) and game theory, agents repeatedly interact and revise their strategies as new data arrives, producing a sequence of strategy profiles. This paper studies sequences of strategies satisfying a…
It is well known that a game equilibrium can be far from efficient or fair, due to the misalignment between individual and social objectives. The focus of this paper is to design a new mechanism framework that induces an efficient and fair…
We discuss and solve a model for a game with many players, where a subset of truely deciding players is embedded into a hierarchy of dependent agents. These interdependencies modify the game matrix and the Nash equilibria for the deciding…