Related papers: Strategically revealing capabilities in General Lo…
In this paper, we consider the problem of resource allocation among two competing users sharing a binary symmetric broadcast channel. We model the interaction between autonomous selfish users in the resource allocation and analyze their…
Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems, cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral…
We consider a scenario in which two reinforcement learning agents repeatedly play a matrix game against each other and update their parameters after each round. The agents' decision-making is transparent to each other, which allows each…
Strategic behaviour is one of the main explanations for cost overruns. It can theoretically be supported by agency theory, in which strategic behaviour is the result of asymmetric information between the principal and agent. This paper…
Probabilistic concurrent/distributed strategies have so far not been investigated thoroughly in the context of imperfect information, where the Player has only partial knowledge of the moves made by the Opponent. In a situation where the…
In order to understand if and how strategic resource allocation can constrain the structure of pair-wise competition outcomes in competitive human competitions we introduce a new multiplayer resource allocation game, the Population Lotto…
Betting games provide a natural setting to capture how information yields strategic advantage. The Kelly criterion for betting, long a cornerstone of portfolio theory and information theory, admits an interpretation in the limit of…
We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…
We study the canonical signaling game, endowing the sender with commitment power: before learning the state, sender designs a strategy, which maps the state into a probability distribution over actions. We provide a geometric…
In the strategic multi-armed bandit setting, when arms possess perfect information about the player's behavior, they can establish an equilibrium where: 1. they retain almost all of their value, 2. they leave the player with a substantial…
This paper proposes the notion of robust PBE in a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. It identifies the utility…
We study how to allocate resources to participants who can strategically misrepresent their deservingness at a cost. A principal assigns item(s) (or money) among multiple agents on the basis of their costly signals. Each agent's signal…
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity…
As wireless communication becomes an ever-more evolving and pervasive part of the existing world, system capacity and Quality of Service (QoS) provisioning are becoming more critically evident. In order to improve system capacity and QoS,…
We consider preference communication in two-player multi-objective normal-form games. In such games, the payoffs resulting from joint actions are vector-valued. Taking a utility-based approach, we assume there exists a utility function for…
The explicit construction is presented of two-player game satisfying: (i) symmetry with respect to the permutation of the players; (ii) the existence of upper bound on total payoff following from Bell inequality; (iii) the existence of…
We study equilibrium strategies and the value of the asymmetric variant of the discrete Colonel Blotto game with $K \geq 2$ battlefields, $B \geq 1$ resources of the weaker player and $A > B$ resources of the stronger player. We derive…
This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…
Many high-stakes decision-making problems, such as those found within cybersecurity and economics, can be modeled as competitive resource allocation games. In these games, multiple players must allocate limited resources to overcome their…
The classical model of signaling games assumes that the receiver exactly know the type space (private information) of the sender and be able to discriminate each type of the sender distinctly. However, the justification of this assumption…