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As quantum computing advances, quantum circuit simulators serve as critical tools to bridge the current gap caused by limited quantum hardware availability. These simulators are typically deployed on cloud platforms, where users submit…

Timing side-channels represent an insidious security challenge for cloud computing, because: (a) massive parallelism in the cloud makes timing channels pervasive and hard to control; (b) timing channels enable one customer to steal…

A large number of crypto accelerators are being deployed with the widespread adoption of IoT. It is vitally important that these accelerators and other security hardware IPs are provably secure. Security is an extra functional requirement…

The deterministic (timing) behavior of real-time systems (RTS) can be used by adversaries - say, to launch side channel attacks or even destabilize the system by denying access to critical resources. We propose a protocol (named REORDER) to…

To meet the ever-growing need for performance in silicon devices, SoC providers have been increasingly relying on software-hardware cooperation. By controlling hardware resources such as power or clock management from the software,…

Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…

Modern processors are highly optimized systems where every single cycle of computation time matters. Many optimizations depend on the data that is being processed. Software-based microarchitectural attacks exploit effects of these…

Spectre attacks exploit speculative execution to leak sensitive information. In the last few years, a number of static side-channel detectors have been proposed to detect cache leakage in the presence of speculative execution. However,…

With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…

As power consumption from AI training and inference continues to increase, AI accelerators are being integrated directly into the CPU. Intel's Advanced Matrix Extensions (AMX) is one such example, debuting on the 4th generation Intel Xeon…

Understanding the behavior of software in execution is a key step in identifying and fixing performance issues. This is especially important in high performance computing contexts where even minor performance tweaks can translate into large…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…

In cache-based side channel attacks, an attacker infers information about the victim based on the presence, or lack thereof, of one or more cachelines. Determining a cacheline's presence, which we refer to as "reading the signal", typically…

Out-of-order speculation, a technique ubiquitous since the early 1990s, remains a fundamental security flaw. Via attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown, an attacker can trick a victim, in an otherwise entirely correct program, into leaking…

Secret-dependent timing behavior in cryptographic implementations has resulted in exploitable vulnerabilities, undermining their security. Over the years, numerous tools to automatically detect timing leakage or even to prove their absence…

Timing-based side or covert channels in processor caches continue to present a threat to computer systems, and they are the key to many of the recent Spectre and Meltdown attacks. Based on improvements to an existing three-step model for…

Cache randomization has recently been revived as a promising defense against conflict-based cache side-channel attacks. As two of the latest implementations, CEASER-S and ScatterCache both claim to thwart conflict-based cache side-channel…

Decoding in a Transformer based language model is inherently sequential as a token's embedding needs to pass through all the layers in the network before the generation of the next token can begin. In this work, we propose a new…

Cache side channel attacks are increasingly alarming in modern processors due to the recent emergence of Spectre and Meltdown attacks. A typical attack performs intentional cache access and manipulates cache states to leak secrets by…