Related papers: Following all the rules: Intuitionistic completene…
A cyclic proof system gives us another way of representing inductive definitions and efficient proof search. In 2011 Brotherston and Simpson conjectured the equivalence between the provability of the classical cyclic proof system and that…
The usual reading of logical implication "A implies B" as "if A then B" fails in intuitionistic logic: there are formulas A and B such that "A implies B" is not provable, even though B is provable whenever A is provable. Intuitionistic…
The discussion about how to put together Gentzen's systems for classical and intuitionistic logic in a single unified system is back in fashion. Indeed, recently Prawitz and others have been discussing the so called Ecumenical Systems,…
This paper discusses proof-theoretic semantics, the project of specifying the meanings of the logical constants in terms of rules of inference governing them. I concentrate on Michael Dummett's and Dag Prawitz' philosophical motivations and…
After surveying classical results, we introduce a generalized notion of inference system to support structural recursion on non-well-founded data types. Besides axioms and inference rules with the usual meaning, a generalized inference…
I deal with two approaches to proof-theoretic semantics: one based on argument structures and justifications, which I call reducibility semantics, and one based on consequence among (sets of) formulas over atomic bases, called base…
We introduce a logic for reasoning about evidence, that essentially views evidence as a function from prior beliefs (before making an observation) to posterior beliefs (after making the observation). We provide a sound and complete…
We introduce a logic for reasoning about evidence that essentially views evidence as a function from prior beliefs (before making an observation) to posterior beliefs (after making the observation). We provide a sound and complete…
Probability theory, epistemically interpreted, provides an excellent, if not the best available account of inductive reasoning. This is so because there are general and definite rules for the change of subjective probabilities through…
By Solovay's celebrated completeness result on formal provability we know that the provability logic $\mathrm GL$ describes exactly all provable structural properties for any sound and strong enough arithmetical theory with a decidable…
A central problem in proof-theory is that of finding criteria for identity of proofs, that is, for when two distinct formal derivations can be taken as denoting the same logical argument. In the literature one finds criteria which are…
Expectation is a central notion in probability theory. The notion of expectation also makes sense for other notions of uncertainty. We introduce a propositional logic for reasoning about expectation, where the semantics depends on the…
Sandqvist gave a proof-theoretic semantics (P-tS) for classical logic (CL) that explicates the meaning of the connectives without assuming bivalance. Later, he gave a semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). While soundness…
This is a short paper about the relationship between logic and computation. More specifically, it is about a relationship between the completeness proof for intuitionistic propositional logic within the form of proof-theoretic semantics…
In this paper we study the logical foundations of automated inductive theorem proving. To that aim we first develop a theoretical model that is centered around the difficulty of finding induction axioms which are sufficient for proving a…
Several different proof translations exist between classical and intuitionistic logic (negative translations), and intuitionistic and linear logic (Girard translations). Our aims in this paper are (1) to consider extensions of…
We propose a logic of interactive proofs as a framework for an intuitionistic foundation for interactive computation, which we construct via an interactive analog of the Goedel-McKinsey-Tarski-Artemov definition of Intuitionistic Logic as…
Goedel's completeness theorem is concerned with provability, while Girard's theorem in ludics (as well as full completeness theorems in game semantics) are concerned with proofs. Our purpose is to look for a connection between these two…
We present a simpler way than usual to deduce the completeness theorem for the second-oder classical logic from the first-order one. We also extend our method to the case of second-order intuitionistic logic.
Debates concerning philosophical grounds for the validity of classical and intuitionistic logics often have the very nature of logical proofs as one of the main points of controversy. The intuitionist advocates for a strict notion of…