Related papers: The Security Protocol Verifier ProVerif and its Ho…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

Transparency protocols are protocols whose actions can be publicly monitored by observers (such observers may include regulators, rights advocacy groups, or the general public). The observed actions are typically usages of private keys such…

Constrained Horn Clauses (CHCs) are widely adopted as intermediate representations for a variety of verification tasks, including safety checking, invariant synthesis, and interprocedural analysis. This paper introduces CHCVERIF, a…

In the Horn theory based approach for cryptographic protocol analysis, cryptographic protocols and (Dolev-Yao) intruders are modeled by Horn theories and security analysis boils down to solving the derivation problem for Horn theories. This…

We present a new technique for verifying correspondences in security protocols. In particular, correspondences can be used to formalize authentication. Our technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the…

Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…

Security is critical for everything relying on modern digital systems. Because almost all digital interactions are governed by the Internet and cryptographic protocols, these protocols must serve as reliable mechanisms that guarantee core…

This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…

We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…

We present a recursive formulation of the Horn algorithm for deciding the satisfiability of propositional clauses. The usual presentations in imperative pseudo-code are informal and not suitable for simple proofs of its main properties. By…

We show how automatic tools for the verification of linear and branching time properties of procedural, multi-threaded, and functional programs as well as program synthesis can be naturally and uniformly seen as solvers of constraints in…

Security of cryptographic protocols can be analysed by creating a model in a formal language and verifying the model in a tool. All such tools focus on the last part of the analysis, verification, and the interpretation of the specification…

In recent times, many protocols have been proposed to provide security for various information and communication systems. Such protocols must be tested for their functional correctness before they are used in practice. Application of formal…

Automated verification of security protocols based on dynamic root of trust, typically relying on protected hardware such as TPM, involves several challenges that we address in this paper. We model the semantics of trusted computing…

For the formal verification of a network security policy, it is crucial to express the verification goals. These formal goals, called security invariants, should be easy to express for the end user. Focusing on access control and…

In today's world password are mostly used for authentication. This makes them prone to various kinds of attacks like dictionary attacks. A dictionary attack is a method of breaking the password by systematically entering every word in a…

Proof-of-concept exploits help demonstrate software vulnerability beyond doubt and communicate attacks to non-experts. But exploits can be configuration-specific, for example when in Security APIs, where keys are set up specifically for the…

Current formal approaches have been successfully used to find design flaws in many security protocols. However, it is still challenging to automatically analyze protocols due to their large or infinite state spaces. In this paper, we…

We present an algorithm to certify IP spoofing protection of firewall rulesets. The algorithm is machine-verifiably proven sound and its use is demonstrated in real-world scenarios.

Formal verification is crucial for ensuring the robustness of security protocols against adversarial attacks. The Needham-Schroeder protocol, a foundational authentication mechanism, has been extensively studied, including its integration…