Related papers: Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures
Game dynamics theory, as a field of science, the consistency of theory and experiment is essential. In the past 10 years, important progress has been made in the merging of the theory and experiment in this field, in which dynamics cycle is…
We study strategic network formation games in which agents attempt to form (costly) links in order to maximize their network centrality. Our model derives from Jackson and Wolinsky's symmetric connection model, but allows for heterogeneity…
A model of Boolean game with only one free parameter $p$ that denotes the strength of herd behavior is proposed where each agent acts according to the information obtained from his neighbors in network and those in the minority are…
The n-person Prisoner's Dilemma is a widely used model for populations where individuals interact in groups. The evolutionary stability of populations has been analysed in the literature for the case where mutations in the population may be…
We consider a set of agents who have claims on an endowment that is not large enough to cover all claims. Agents can form coalitions but a minimal coalition size $\theta$ is required to have positive coalitional funding that is proportional…
Applications, such as military and disaster response, can benefit from robotic collectives' ability to perform multiple cooperative tasks (e.g., surveillance, damage assessments) efficiently across a large spatial area. Coalition formation…
We consider a setting where one has to organize one or several group activities for a set of agents. Each agent will participate in at most one activity, and her preferences over activities depend on the number of participants in the…
The analysis of equilibrium points in random games has been of great interest in evolutionary game theory, with important implications for understanding of complexity in a dynamical system, such as its behavioural, cultural or biological…
The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…
Interactions among individuals in natural populations often occur in a dynamically changing environment. Understanding the role of environmental variation in population dynamics has long been a central topic in theoretical ecology and…
This paper explores a novel extension of dynamic matching theory by analyzing a three-way matching problem involving agents from three distinct populations, each with two possible types. Unlike traditional static or two-way dynamic models,…
Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…
In the usual models of cooperative game theory, the outcome of a coalition formation process is either the grand coalition or a coalition structure that consists of disjoint coalitions. However, in many domains where coalitions are…
We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and…
We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information available to players about their groups' position in the sequence.…
This paper is concerned with the problem of controlling a system of constrained dynamic subsystems in a way that balances the performance degradation of decentralized control with the practical cost of centralized control. We propose a…
In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
This paper studies an incentive structure for cooperation and its stability in peer-assisted services when there exist multiple content providers, using a coalition game theoretic approach. We first consider a generalized coalition…
The assignment of personnel to teams is a fundamental and ubiquitous managerial function, typically involving several objectives and a variety of idiosyncratic practical constraints. Despite the prevalence of this task in practice, the…