Related papers: Partially Observable Discrete-time Discounted Mark…

Establishing the existence of Nash equilibria for partially observed stochastic dynamic games is known to be quite challenging, with the difficulties stemming from the noisy nature of the measurements available to individual players…

We consider stochastic differential games with $N$ nearly identical players, linear-Gaussian dynamics, and infinite horizon discounted quadratic cost. Admissible controls are feedbacks for which the system is ergodic. We first study the…

We study decision timing problems on finite horizon with Poissonian information arrivals. In our model, a decision maker wishes to optimally time her action in order to maximize her expected reward. The reward depends on an unobservable…

Partially observable stochastic games provide a rich mathematical paradigm for modeling multi-agent dynamic decision making under uncertainty and partial information. However, they generally do not admit closed-form solutions and are…

An ideal strategy in zero-sum games should not only grant the player an average reward no less than the value of Nash equilibrium, but also exploit the (adaptive) opponents when they are suboptimal. While most existing works in Markov games…

In this paper we consider two-person zero-sum risk-sensitive stochastic dynamic games with Borel state and action spaces and bounded reward. The term risk-sensitive refers to the fact that instead of the usual risk neutral optimization…

A combinatorial game is a two-player game without hidden information or chance elements. The main object of combinatorial game theory is to obtain the outcome, which player has a winning strategy, of a given combinatorial game. Positions of…

This survey is organized around three main topics: models, econometrics, and empirical applications. Section 2 presents the theoretical framework, introduces the concept of Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium, discusses existence and…

Optimal policies in standard MDPs can be obtained using either value iteration or policy iteration. However, in the case of zero-sum Markov games, there is no efficient policy iteration algorithm; e.g., it has been shown that one has to…

Two-player quantitative zero-sum games provide a natural framework to synthesize controllers with performance guarantees for reactive systems within an uncontrollable environment. Classical settings include mean-payoff games, where the…

This paper introduces state abstraction for two-player zero-sum Markov games (TZMGs), where the payoffs for the two players are determined by the state representing the environment and their respective actions, with state transitions…

We study observation-based strategies for partially-observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs) with omega-regular objectives. An observation-based strategy relies on partial information about the history of a play, namely, on the past…

Zero-sum Dynkin games under Poisson constraints, where players can only stop at the event times of a Poisson process, have been studied widely in the recent literature. The constraint can be modelled in two ways: either both players share…

We introduce the concept of budget games. Players choose a set of tasks and each task has a certain demand on every resource in the game. Each resource has a budget. If the budget is not enough to satisfy the sum of all demands, it has to…

In this paper, we consider discrete-time dynamic games of the mean-field type with a finite number $N$ of agents subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of each agent is a locally compact Polish…

We study a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games known as \textit{blind stochastic games}, where players neither observe the state nor receive any information about it during the game. A central concept for analyzing long-duration…

Partial monitoring is a generalization of the well-known multi-armed bandit framework where the loss is not directly observed by the learner. We complete the classification of finite adversarial partial monitoring to include all games,…

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition under which a convex set is approachable in a game with partial monitoring, i.e.\ where players do not observe their opponents' moves but receive random signals. This condition is an extension…

Many real-world decision problems involve the interaction of multiple self-interested agents with limited sensing ability. The partially observable stochastic game (POSG) provides a mathematical framework for modeling these problems,…

Robots deployed to the real world must be able to interact with other agents in their environment. Dynamic game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for modeling scenarios in which agents have individual objectives and…