Related papers: Stackelberg Meta-Learning Based Control for Guided…
Previous research has shown that federated learning (FL) systems are exposed to an array of security risks. Despite the proposal of several defensive strategies, they tend to be non-adaptive and specific to certain types of attacks,…
Recent work on decision making and planning for autonomous driving has made use of game theoretic methods to model interaction between agents. We demonstrate that methods based on the Stackelberg game formulation of this problem are…
This paper investigates a linear quadratic mean field leader-follower team problem, where the model involves one leader and a large number of weakly-coupled interactive followers. The leader and the followers cooperate to optimize the…
We present a framework combining hierarchical and multi-agent deep reinforcement learning approaches to solve coordination problems among a multitude of agents using a semi-decentralized model. The framework extends the multi-agent learning…
This paper is concerned with the stochastic linear quadratic Stackelberg differential game with overlapping information, where the diffusion terms contain the control and state variables. Here the term "overlapping" means that there are…
This paper studies multi-user communication systems with two groups of users: leaders which possess system information, and followers which have no system information using the formulation of Stackelberg games. In such games, the leaders…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…
We study a two-player dynamic Stackelberg game where the follower's intention is unknown to the leader. Classical formulations of the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE) assume that the follower's best response (BR) function is known to the…
When interacting with other decision-making agents in non-adversarial scenarios, it is critical for an autonomous agent to have inferable behavior: The agent's actions must convey their intention and strategy. We model the inferability…
With recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) for reasoning, planning, and complex task generation, artificial intelligence systems are transitioning from isolated single-agent architectures to multi-agent systems with…
Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to…
We propose a single-level numerical approach to solve Stackelberg mean field game (MFG) problems. In Stackelberg MFG, an infinite population of agents play a non-cooperative game and choose their controls to optimize their individual…
In this paper, we are concerned with the stabilizatbility of Stackelberg game-based systems. In particular, two players are involved in the system where one is the follower to minimize the related cost function and the other is the leader…
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the…
Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…
We study the problem of imitation learning from demonstrations of multiple coordinating agents. One key challenge in this setting is that learning a good model of coordination can be difficult, since coordination is often implicit in the…
In the literature on game-theoretic equilibrium finding, focus has mainly been on solving a single game in isolation. In practice, however, strategic interactions -- ranging from routing problems to online advertising auctions -- evolve…
In this technical note, we consider the linear-quadratic time-inconsistent mean-field type leader-follower Stackelberg differential game with an adapted open-loop information structure. The objective functionals of the leader and the…
Adversarial decision-making in partially observable multi-agent systems requires sophisticated strategies for both deception and counter-deception. This paper presents a sequential hypothesis testing (SHT)-driven framework that captures the…