Related papers: The Sample Complexity of Online Contract Design
We address the question of repeatedly learning linear classifiers against agents who are strategically trying to game the deployed classifiers, and we use the Stackelberg regret to measure the performance of our algorithms. First, we show…
We study various discrete nonlinear combinatorial optimization problems in an online learning framework. In the first part, we address the question of whether there are negative results showing that getting a vanishing (or even vanishing…
We study an asynchronous online learning setting with a network of agents. At each time step, some of the agents are activated, requested to make a prediction, and pay the corresponding loss. The loss function is then revealed to these…
We give improved tradeoffs between space and regret for the online learning with expert advice problem over $T$ days with $n$ experts. Given a space budget of $n^{\delta}$ for $\delta \in (0,1)$, we provide an algorithm achieving regret…
Bilateral trade models the task of intermediating between two strategic agents, a seller and a buyer, who wish to trade a good. We study this problem from the perspective of a profit-maximizing broker within an online learning framework,…
We study online learning in the random-order model, where the multiset of loss functions is chosen adversarially but revealed in a uniformly random order. By extending the batch-to-online transformation of Dong and Yoshida (2023), we show…
We initiate the study of online contracts, which integrate the game-theoretic considerations of economic contract theory, with the algorithmic and informational challenges of online algorithm design. Our starting point is the classic online…
We study the problem of online learning (OL) from revealed preferences: a learner wishes to learn a non-strategic agent's private utility function through observing the agent's utility-maximizing actions in a changing environment. We adopt…
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the…
We consider the problem of online classification under a privacy constraint. In this setting a learner observes sequentially a stream of labelled examples $(x_t, y_t)$, for $1 \leq t \leq T$, and returns at each iteration $t$ a hypothesis…
In an online contract selection problem there is a seller which offers a set of contracts to sequentially arriving buyers whose types are drawn from an unknown distribution. If there exists a profitable contract for the buyer in the offered…
In this work, we investigate the online learning problem of revenue maximization in ad auctions, where the seller needs to learn the click-through rates (CTRs) of each ad candidate and charge the price of the winner through a pay-per-click…
We consider the problem of online combinatorial optimization under semi-bandit feedback, where a learner has to repeatedly pick actions from a combinatorial decision set in order to minimize the total losses associated with its decisions.…
We study a repeated game between a supplier and a retailer who want to maximize their respective profits without full knowledge of the problem parameters. After characterizing the uniqueness of the Stackelberg equilibrium of the stage game…
Stochastic linear bandits are a fundamental model for sequential decision making, where an agent selects a vector-valued action and receives a noisy reward with expected value given by an unknown linear function. Although well studied in…
In this paper, we study a class of online optimization problems with long-term budget constraints where the objective functions are not necessarily concave (nor convex) but they instead satisfy the Diminishing Returns (DR) property.…
In the principal-agent problem formulated by Myerson'82, agents have private information (type) and make private decisions (action), both of which are unobservable to the principal. Myerson pointed out an elegant linear programming solution…
We study online learning in repeated first-price auctions where a bidder, only observing the winning bid at the end of each auction, learns to adaptively bid in order to maximize her cumulative payoff. To achieve this goal, the bidder faces…
We study an online learning version of the generalized principal-agent model, where a principal interacts repeatedly with a strategic agent possessing private types, private rewards, and taking unobservable actions. The agent is non-myopic,…
We study online inverse linear optimization, also known as contextual recommendation, where a learner sequentially infers an agent's hidden objective vector from observed optimal actions over feasible sets that change over time. The learner…