Related papers: Voting on Cyclic Orders, Group Theory, and Ballots
We characterize model polynomials that are cyclic in Dirichlet-type spaces in the unit ball of $\mathbb{C}^n$, and we give a sufficient capacity condition in order to identify non-cyclic vectors.
We call $n$ a cyclic number if every group of order $n$ is cyclic. It is implicit in work of Dickson, and explicit in work of Szele, that $n$ is cyclic precisely when $\gcd(n,\phi(n))=1$. With $C(x)$ denoting the count of cyclic $n\le x$,…
Social choice theory is the study of preference aggregation across a population, used both in mechanism design for human agents and in the democratic alignment of language models. In this study, we propose the representative social choice…
We introduce and study the block voter model with noise on two-dimensional square lattices using Monte Carlo simulations and finite-size scaling techniques. The model is defined by an outflow dynamics where a central set of $N_{PCS}$ spins,…
We study the collective schedules problem, which consists in computing a one machine schedule of a set of tasks, knowing that a set of individuals (also called voters) have preferences regarding the order of the execution of the tasks. Our…
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has been suggested to let agents submit partial…
We present a survey of exact and asymptotic formulas on the number of cyclic subgroups and total number of subgroups of the groups ${\Bbb Z}_{n_1} \times \cdots \times {\Bbb Z}_{n_k}$, where $k\ge 2$ and $n_1,\ldots,n_k$ are arbitrary…
We enumerate total cyclic orders on $\left\{1,\ldots,n\right\}$ where we prescribe the relative cyclic order of consecutive triples $(i,{i+1},{i+2})$, these integers being taken modulo $n$. In some cases, the problem reduces to the…
We consider three algorithms for allocating parliamentary seats by proportional representation. The usual approach to describing such algorithms is to compute a quota of votes that each party uses to "acquire'' representatives. This kind of…
Let $G$ be a group. \textit{The permutability graph of cyclic subgroups of $G$}, denoted by $\Gamma_c(G)$, is a graph with all the proper cyclic subgroups of $G$ as its vertices and two distinct vertices in $\Gamma_c(G)$ are adjacent if and…
Let $n$ be a positive integer, $\sigma$ be an element of the symmetric group $\mathcal{S}_n$ and let $\sigma$ be a cycle of length $n$. The elements $\alpha ,\beta \in \mathcal{S}_n$ are $\sigma$-equivalent, if there are natural numbers $k$…
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated according to a voting protocol. However, in realistic settings,…
This work contributes to a foundational question in economic theory: how do individual-level cognitive biases interact with collective choice mechanisms? We study a setting where voters hold intrinsic preference rankings over a set of…
We study sorting algorithms based on randomized round-robin comparisons. Specifically, we study Spin-the-bottle sort, where comparisons are unrestricted, and Annealing sort, where comparisons are restricted to a distance bounded by a…
In this paper, we introduce a kind of decomposition of a finite group called a uniform group factorization, as a generalization of exact factorizations of a finite group. A group $G$ is said to admit a uniform group factorization if there…
Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now, let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the…
We prove an analogue of the classical ballot theorem that holds for any random walk in the range of attraction of the normal distribution. Our result is best possible: we exhibit examples demonstrating that if any of our hypotheses are…
The game of best choice (also known as the secretary problem) is a model for sequential decision making with a long history and many variations. The classical setup assumes that the sequence of candidate rankings are uniformly distributed.…
The Condorcet criterion (CC) is a classical and well-accepted criterion for voting. Unfortunately, it is incompatible with many other desiderata including participation (Par), half-way monotonicity (HM), Maskin monotonicity (MM), and…
Divisor methods are well known to satisfy house monotonicity, which allows representative seats to be allocated sequentially. We focus on stationary divisor methods defined by a rounding cutpoint $c \in [0,1]$. For such methods with…