Related papers: Unexploitable games and unbeatable strategies

Imitation sometimes achieves success in multi-agent situations even though it is very simple. In game theory, success of imitation has been characterized by unbeatability against other agents. Previous studies specified conditions under…

We show that for many classes of symmetric two-player games, the simple decision rule "imitate-the-best" can hardly be beaten by any other decision rule. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for imitation to be unbeatable and show…

We characterize the class of symmetric two-player games in which tit-for-tat cannot be beaten even by very sophisticated opponents in a repeated game. It turns out to be the class of exact potential games. More generally, there is a class…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

Two-team zero-sum games are one of the most important paradigms in game theory. In this paper, we focus on finding an unexploitable equilibrium in large team games. An unexploitable equilibrium is a worst-case policy, where members in the…

It is well-known that for infinitely repeated games, there are computable strategies that have best responses, but no computable best responses. These results were originally proved for either specific games (e.g., Prisoner's dilemma), or…

Repeated games have a long tradition in the behavioral sciences and evolutionary biology. Recently, strategies were discovered that permit an unprecedented level of control over repeated interactions by enabling a player to unilaterally…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are known to be intractable, unless the information flow is severely restricted. Examples of undecidable cases typically feature a situation where players…

Tit-for-Tat strategy is a strategy in repeated two-player symmetric games which imitates the previous action of the opponent. We show that the Tit-for-Tat strategy is a zero-determinant strategy, which unilaterally equalizes the expected…

Imitation is a key component of human social behavior, and is widely used by both children and adults as a way to navigate uncertain or unfamiliar situations. But in an environment populated by multiple heterogeneous agents pursuing…

In this paper, we study the notion of admissibility for randomised strategies in concurrent games. Intuitively, an admissible strategy is one where the player plays `as well as possible', because there is no other strategy that dominates…

Infinite games where several players seek to coordinate under imperfect information are deemed to be undecidable, unless the information is hierarchically ordered among the players. We identify a class of games for which joint winning…

We construct several definitions of imbalance and playability, both of which are related to the existence of dominated strategies. Specifically, a maximally balanced game and a playable game cannot have dominated strategies for any player.…

We investigate multi-round team competitions between two teams, where each team selects one of its players simultaneously in each round and each player can play at most once. The competition defines an extensive-form game with perfect…

In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…

Evolutionary game theory has been an important tool for describing economic and social behaviour for decades. Approximate mean value equations describing the time evolution of strategy concentrations can be derived from the players'…

We investigate uniformity properties of strategies. These properties involve sets of plays in order to express useful constraints on strategies that are not \mu-calculus definable. Typically, we can state that a strategy is…

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of strategies in repeated games which unilaterally control payoffs. Zero-determinant strategies have attracted much attention in studies of social dilemma, particularly in the context of evolution of…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…