Related papers: Truthful Matching with Online Items and Offline Ag…
We study the problem of online unweighted bipartite matching with $n$ offline vertices and $n$ online vertices where one wishes to be competitive against the optimal offline algorithm. While the classic RANKING algorithm of Karp et al.…
We consider the allocation of limited resources to heterogeneous customers who arrive in an online fashion. We would like to allocate the resources "fairly", so that no group of customers is marginalized in terms of their overall service…
In this research, we study the problem that a collector acquires items from the owner based on the item qualities the owner declares and an independent appraiser's assessments. The owner is interested in maximizing the probability that the…
We consider the maximum bipartite matching problem in stochastic settings, namely the query-commit and price-of-information models. In the query-commit model, an edge e independently exists with probability $p_e$. We can query whether an…
Consider a matching problem on a graph where disjoint sets of vertices are privately owned by self-interested agents. An edge between a pair of vertices indicates compatibility and allows the vertices to match. We seek a mechanism to…
In this paper, we study the Maximum Vertex-weighted $b$-Matching (MVbM) problem on bipartite graphs in a new game-theoretical environment. In contrast to other game-theoretical settings, we consider the case in which the value of the tasks…
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an \alpha-approximation algorithm translates into an…
We study no-money mechanisms for allocating indivisible items to strategic agents with additive preferences under a stochastic model. In this model, items' values are drawn from an underlying distribution and mechanisms are evaluated with…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
In their seminal paper, Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani (STOC'90) introduce the online bipartite matching problem, and the RANKING algorithm, which admits a tight $1-\frac{1}{e}$ competitive ratio. Since its publication, the problem has…
We study fair and efficient allocation of divisible goods, in an online manner, among $n$ agents. The goods arrive online in a sequence of $T$ time periods. The agents' values for a good are revealed only after its arrival, and the online…
Mechanism design is addressed in the context of fair allocations of indivisible goods with monetary compensation. Motivated by a real-world social choice problem, mechanisms with verification are considered in a setting where (i) agents'…
We study the probabilistic assignment of items to platforms that satisfies both group and individual fairness constraints. Each item belongs to specific groups and has a preference ordering over platforms. Each platform enforces group…
We consider a generalization of the vertex weighted online bipartite matching problem where the offline vertices, called resources, are reusable. In particular, when a resource is matched it is unavailable for a deterministic time duration…
Most prior work on online matching problems has been with the flexibility of keeping some vertices unmatched. We study three related online matching problems with the constraint of matching every vertex, i.e., with no rejections. We adopt a…
This paper studies a matching problem in which a group of agents cooperate with agents on two sides. In environments with either nontransferable or transferable utilities, we demonstrate that a stable outcome exists when cooperations…
We study an online version of the max-min fair allocation problem for indivisible items. In this problem, items arrive one by one, and each item must be allocated irrevocably on arrival to one of $n$ agents, who have additive valuations for…
Bipartite matching markets pair agents on one side of a market with agents, items, or contracts on the opposing side. Prior work addresses online bipartite matching markets, where agents arrive over time and are dynamically matched to a…
In digital goods auctions, there is an auctioneer who sells an item with unlimited supply to a set of potential buyers, and the objective is to design truthful auction to maximize the total profit of the auctioneer. Motivated from an…
Online bipartite matching has been extensively studied. In the unweighted setting, Karp et al. gave an optimal $(1 - 1/e)$-competitive randomized algorithm. In the weighted setting, optimal algorithms have been achieved only under…