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This paper addresses the challenge of limited observations in non-cooperative multi-agent systems where agents can have partial access to other agents' actions. We present the generalized individual Q-learning dynamics that combine…

In this work we propose a kinetic formulation for evolutionary game theory for zero sum games when the agents use mixed strategies. We start with a simple adaptive rule, where after an encounter each agent increases the probability of play…

We introduce consumption games, a model for discrete interactive system with multiple resources that are consumed or reloaded independently. More precisely, a consumption game is a finite-state graph where each transition is labeled by a…

We study best-response type learning dynamics for zero-sum polymatrix games under two information settings. The two settings are distinguished by the type of information that each player has about the game and their opponents' strategy. The…

This paper studies the last-iterate convergence properties of the exponential weights algorithm with constant learning rates. We consider a repeated interaction in discrete time, where each player uses an exponential weights algorithm…

In this paper we investigate the Follow the Regularized Leader dynamics in sequential imperfect information games (IIG). We generalize existing results of Poincar\'e recurrence from normal-form games to zero-sum two-player imperfect…

In this paper we characterise the long-run behaviour of the replicator dynamic in zero-sum games (symmetric or non-symmetric). Specifically, we prove that every zero-sum game possesses a unique global replicator attractor, which we then…

We consider a wireless networked control system (WNCS) with multiple controllers and multiple attackers. The dynamic interaction between the controllers and the attackers is modeled as a linear quadratic (LQ) zero-sum difference game with…

Computing approximate Nash equilibria in multi-player general-sum Markov games is a computationally intractable task. However, multi-player Markov games with certain cooperative or competitive structures might circumvent this…

In an inverse game problem, one needs to infer the cost function of the players in a game such that a desired joint strategy is a Nash equilibrium. We study the inverse game problem for a class of multiplayer matrix games, where the cost…

What does it mean to fully understand the behavior of a network of adaptive agents? The golden standard typically is the behavior of learning dynamics in potential games, where many evolutionary dynamics, e.g., replicator, are known to…

We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…

We present a scheme for playing quantum repeated 2x2 games based on the Marinatto and Weber's approach to quantum games. As a potential application, we study twice repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game. We show that results not available in…

In this paper, we deal with the equilibrium selection problem, which amounts to steering a population of individuals engaged in strategic game-theoretic interactions to a desired collective behavior. In the literature, this problem has been…

Games generalize the single-objective optimization paradigm by introducing different objective functions for different players. Differentiable games often proceed by simultaneous or alternating gradient updates. In machine learning, games…

Iterated coopetitive games capture the situation when one must efficiently balance between cooperation and competition with the other agents over time in order to win the game (e.g., to become the player with highest total utility).…

In a seminal paper, Meyer [David Meyer, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 1052 (1999)] described the advantages of quantum game theory by looking at the classical penny flip game. A player using a quantum strategy can win against a classical player…

We study the population genetics of Evolution in the important special case of weak selection, in which all fitness values are assumed to be close to one another. We show that in this regime natural selection is tantamount to the…

We present the first study of a dynamical quantum game. Each agent has a `memory' of her performance over the previous m timesteps, and her strategy can evolve in time. The game exhibits distinct regimes of optimality. For small m the…

We consider game theory from the perspective of quantum algorithms. Strategies in classical game theory are either pure (deterministic) or mixed (probabilistic). We introduce these basic ideas in the context of a simple example, closely…