Related papers: Monotonic Mechanisms for Selling Multiple Goods
We study revenue maximization in multi-item multi-bidder auctions under the natural item-independence assumption - a classical problem in Multi-Dimensional Bayesian Mechanism Design. One of the biggest challenges in this area is developing…
We study envy-free pricing mechanisms in matching markets with $m$ items and $n$ budget constrained buyers. Each buyer is interested in a subset of the items on sale, and she appraises at some single-value every item in her preference-set.…
Metric regularity is among the central concepts of nonlinear and variational analysis, constrained optimization, and their numerous applications. However, metric regularity can be elusive for some important ill-posed classes of problems…
In this paper we consider the problem of pricing multiple differentiated products. This is challenging as a price change in one product, not only changes the demand of that particular product, but also the demand for the other products. To…
We study procurement games where each seller supplies multiple units of his item, with a cost per unit known only to him. The buyer can purchase any number of units from each seller, values different combinations of the items differently,…
This study explores the monotonicity of adaptive clinching auctions -- a key mechanism in budget-constrained auctions -- with respect to fluctuations in the number of bidders. Specifically, we investigate how the addition of new bidders…
We consider the fundamental problem of designing a truthful single-item auction with the challenging objective of extracting a large fraction of the highest agent valuation as revenue. Following a recent trend in algorithm design, we assume…
We consider the problem of maximizing a monotone nondecreasing set function under multiple constraints, where the constraints are also characterized by monotone nondecreasing set functions. We propose two greedy algorithms to solve the…
This paper reexamines the classic problem of revenue maximization in single-item auctions with $n$ buyers under the lens of the robust optimization framework. The celebrated Myerson's mechanism is the format that maximizes the seller's…
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make the allocation and payment decisions…
Since economic mechanisms are often applied to very different instances of the same problem, it is desirable to identify mechanisms that work well in a wide range of circumstances. We pursue this goal for a position auction setting and…
We characterize the extreme points of multidimensional monotone functions from $[0,1]^n$ to $[0,1]$, as well as the extreme points of the set of one-dimensional marginals of these functions. These characterizations lead to new results for…
We provide algorithms that learn simple auctions whose revenue is approximately optimal in multi-item multi-bidder settings, for a wide range of valuations including unit-demand, additive, constrained additive, XOS, and subadditive. We…
Currently, knowledge discovery in databases is an essential step to identify valid, novel and useful patterns for decision making. There are many real-world scenarios, such as bankruptcy prediction, option pricing or medical diagnosis,…
We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the…
We consider the problem of maximizing revenue when selling k items to a single buyer with known valuation distributions. We show that for a single, additive buyer whose valuations for for the items are distributed according to i.i.d.…
A moldable job is a job that can be executed on an arbitrary number of processors, and whose processing time depends on the number of processors allotted to it. A moldable job is monotone if its work doesn't decrease for an increasing…
Algorithms for determining quality/cost/price tradeoffs in saturated markets are considered. A product is modeled by $d$ real-valued qualities whose sum determines the unit cost of producing the product. This leads to the following…
We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to…
Dynamic pricing is commonly used to regulate congestion in shared service systems. This paper is motivated by the fact that in the presence of users with varying price sensitivity (responsiveness), conventional monotonic pricing can lead to…