Related papers: Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Atta…
It has been a long standing problem to securely outsource computation tasks to an untrusted party with integrity and confidentiality guarantees. While fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a promising technique that allows computations…
In this work, we identify a set of side-channels in our Confidential Federated Compute platform that a hypothetical insider could exploit to circumvent differential privacy (DP) guarantees. We show how DP can mitigate two of the…
Modern multi-core processors share cache resources for maximum cache utilization and performance gains. However, this leaves the cache vulnerable to side-channel attacks, where timing differences in shared cache behavior are exploited to…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow the secure execution of code on remote systems without the need to trust their operators. They use static attestation as a central mechanism for establishing trust, allowing remote parties to…
This paper presents an approach to provide strong assurance of the secure execution of distributed event-driven applications on shared infrastructures, while relying on a small Trusted Computing Base. We build upon and extend security…
We are interested in investigating the security of source encryption with a symmetric key under side-channel attacks. In this paper, we propose a general framework of source encryption with a symmetric key under the side-channel attacks,…
Cache side channel attacks are a sophisticated and persistent threat that exploit vulnerabilities in modern processors to extract sensitive information. These attacks leverage weaknesses in shared computational resources, particularly the…
A smart contract on a blockchain cannot keep a secret because its data is replicated on all nodes in a network. To remedy this problem, it has been suggested to combine blockchains with trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have become a cornerstone of confidential computing, attracting significant attention from academia and industry. To support secure and scalable application deployment on confidential clouds, TEE…
Cache attacks pose a threat to any code whose execution flow or memory accesses depend on sensitive information. Especially in public clouds, where caches are shared across several tenants, cache attacks remain an unsolved problem. Cache…
Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide isolation guarantees for data in use, but their threat model does not include physical level protection and side-channel attacks. Therefore, current deployments rely on trusted cloud providers to…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are a feature of modern central processing units (CPUs) that aim to provide a high assurance, isolated environment in which to run workloads that demand both confidentiality and integrity. Hardware and…
The growing availability of hardware-based trusted execution environments (TEEs) in commodity processors has recently advanced support (i.e., design, implementation and deployment frameworks) for network-based secure services. Examples of…
The deployment of large language models (LLMs) on third-party devices requires new ways to protect model intellectual property. While Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer a promising solution, their performance limits can lead to a…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…
Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…
Data theft and leakage, caused by external adversaries and insiders, demonstrate the need for protecting user data. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer a promising solution by creating secure environments that protect data and code…
In the era of microarchitectural side channels, vendors scramble to deploy mitigations for transient execution attacks, but leave traditional side-channel attacks against sensitive software (e.g., crypto programs) to be fixed by developers…
Rijndael was standardized in 2001 by National Institute of Standard and Technology as the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). AES is still being used to encrypt financial, military and even government confidential data. In 2005, Bernstein…