Related papers: Cipherfix: Mitigating Ciphertext Side-Channel Atta…
Recently, the new ciphertext side channels resulting from the deterministic memory encryption in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), enable ciphertexts to manifest identifiable patterns when being sequentially written to the same memory…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer hardware-assisted means to protect code and data. However, as shown in numerous results over the years, attackers can use side-channels to leak data access patterns and even single-step the code.…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are gradually adopted by major cloud providers, offering a practical option of \emph{confidential computing} for users who don't fully trust public clouds. TEEs use CPU-enabled hardware features to…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been proposed as a solution to protect code confidentiality in scenarios where computation is outsourced to an untrusted operator. We study the resilience of such solutions to side-channel attacks…
The growth of cloud computing has revolutionized data processing and storage capacities to another levels of scalability and flexibility. But in the process, it has created a huge challenge of security, especially in terms of safeguarding…
In this paper we introduced countermeasures against side-channel attacks in the shared memory of TrustZone. We proposed zero-contention cache memory or policy between REE and TEE to prevent from TruSpy attacks in TrustZone. And we suggested…
Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel.…
Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel Software Guard eXtensions (SGX), are considered as a promising approach to resolve security challenges in clouds. TEEs protect the confidentiality and integrity of application code and…
Constant-time code has become the de-facto standard for secure cryptographic implementations. However, some memory-based leakage classes such as ciphertext side-channels and silent stores remain unaddressed. Prior work proposed three…
Shared cache resources in multi-core processors are vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks. Recently proposed defenses have their own caveats: Randomization-based defenses are vulnerable to the evolving attack algorithms besides relying…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
Microarchitectural side channels expose unprotected software to information leakage attacks where a software adversary is able to track runtime behavior of a benign process and steal secrets such as cryptographic keys. As suggested by…
New hardware primitives such as Intel SGX secure a user-level process in presence of an untrusted or compromised OS. Such "enclaved execution" systems are vulnerable to several side-channels, one of which is the page fault channel. In this…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are critical components of modern secure computing, providing isolated zones in processors to safeguard sensitive data and execute secure operations. Despite their importance, TEEs are increasingly…
Cache timing attacks allow third-party observers to retrieve sensitive information from program executions. But, is it possible to automatically check the vulnerability of a program against cache timing attacks and then, automatically…
With the increasing popularity of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, securing sensitive user data has emerged as a major challenge. These devices often collect confidential information, such as audio and visual data, through peripheral…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) protect confidentiality and integrity of trusted applications by creating an isolated environment for executing code. Prior work has shown that users may feel more comfortable sharing data when they…
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow user processes to create enclaves that protect security-sensitive computation against access from the OS kernel and the hypervisor. Recent work has shown that TEEs are vulnerable to side-channel…
Hardware-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) are becoming increasingly prevalent in cloud computing, forming the basis for confidential computing. However, the security goals of TEEs sometimes conflict with existing cloud…