Related papers: An Axiomatic Characterization of Split Cycle
We develop a mathematical model to describe the persistence of rule-breaking behaviors in societies, such as traffic violations, disregard for legal restrictions and other forms of noncompliance. Using a replicator-type dynamics with…
In this paper we investigate the possibility of reducing the complexity of a system composed of a large number of interacting agents, whose dynamics feature a symmetry breaking. We consider first order stochastic differential equations…
We study two-stage committee elections where voters have dynamic preferences over candidates; at each stage, a committee is chosen under a given voting rule. We are interested in identifying a winning committee for the second stage that…
A recent report of Littmann [Commun. ACM '21] outlines the existence and the fatal impact of collusion rings in academic peer reviewing. We introduce and analyze the problem Cycle-Free Reviewing that aims at finding a review assignment…
Disparate treatment occurs when a machine learning model yields different decisions for individuals based on a sensitive attribute (e.g., age, sex). In domains where prediction accuracy is paramount, it could potentially be acceptable to…
This work introduces a Bayesian framework that unifies a wide class of opinion dynamics models. In this framework, an individual's opinion on a topic is the expected value of their belief, represented as a random variable with a prior…
Despite many examples to the contrary, most models of elections assume that rules determining the winner will be followed. We present a model where elections are solely a public signal of the incumbent popularity, and citizens can protests…
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these…
Multi-stage decision-making under uncertainty, where decisions are taken under sequentially revealing uncertain problem parameters, is often essential to faithfully model managerial problems. Given the significant computational challenges…
Collective decision making processes lie at the heart of many social, political and economic challenges. The classical voter model is a well-established conceptual model to study such processes. In this work, we define a new form of…
Majority voting is one of the few black-box interventions that can improve a fixed stochastic predictor: repeated access can be cheaper than changing a high-capability model. Classical fixed-competence theory makes this intervention look…
As the world's democratic institutions are challenged by dissatisfied citizens, political scientists and also computer scientists have proposed and analyzed various (innovative) methods to select representative bodies, a crucial task in…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
We contribute to the programme of lifting proportionality axioms from the multi-winner voting setting to participatory budgeting. We define novel proportionality axioms for participatory budgeting and test them on known…
Recent theories from complexity science argue that complex dynamics are ubiquitous in social and economic systems. These claims emerge from the analysis of individually simple agents whose collective behavior is surprisingly complicated.…
In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…
In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of…
A recently proposed model of social interaction in voting is investigated by simplifying it down into a version that is more analytically tractable and which allows a mathematical analysis to be performed. This analysis clarifies the…
How to design fair and (computationally) efficient voting rules is a central challenge in Computational Social Choice. In this paper, we aim at designing efficient algorithms for computing most equitable rules for large classes of…
We provide a formal framework accounting for a widespread idea in the theory of economic design: analytically established incompatibilities between given axioms should be qualified by the likelihood of their violation. We define the degree…