Related papers: Sequential Elimination Voting Games
We study a routing game in which one of the players unilaterally acts altruistically by taking into consideration the latency cost of other players as well as his own. By not playing selfishly, a player can not only improve the other…
The finitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma is a good illustration of the discrepancy between the strategic behaviour suggested by a game-theoretic analysis and the behaviour often observed among human players, where cooperation is maintained…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of continuous-action game without access to gradients. Such game access is common in reinforcement learning settings, where the environment is typically treated as a black…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…
This paper studies sequential quantum games under the assumption that the moves of the players are drawn from groups and not just plain sets. The extra group structure makes possible to easily derive some very general results characterizing…
Consider a population of agents who repeatedly compete for awards, as in the case of researchers annually applying for grants. Noise in the selection process may encourage entry of low quality proposals, forcing the principal to commit…
Motivated by the success of the serial dictatorship mechanism in social choice settings, we explore its usefulness in tackling various combinatorial optimization problems. We do so by considering an abstract model, in which a set of agents…
In game theory, a trusted mediator acting on behalf of the players can enable the attainment of correlated equilibria, which may provide better payoffs than those available from the Nash equilibria alone. We explore the approach of…
The probabilistic serial (PS) rule is one of the most prominent randomized rules for the assignment problem. It is well-known for its superior fairness and welfare properties. However, PS is not immune to manipulative behaviour by the…
Sequential allocation is a simple and widely studied mechanism to allocate indivisible items in turns to agents according to a pre-specified picking sequence of agents. At each turn, the current agent in the picking sequence picks its most…
The iterated prisoner's dilemma is a game that produces many counter-intuitive and complex behaviors in a social environment, based on very simple basic rules. It illustrates that cooperation can be a good thing even in a competitive world,…
Scoring protocols are a broad class of voting systems. Each is defined by a vector $(\alpha_1,\alpha_2,...,\alpha_m)$, $\alpha_1 \geq \alpha_2 \geq >... \geq \alpha_m$, of integers such that each voter contributes $\alpha_1$ points to…
We study stochastic effects on the lagging anchor dynamics, a reinforcement learning algorithm used to learn successful strategies in iterated games, which is known to converge to Nash points in the absence of noise. The dynamics is…
In this article, we study the behavior of a broad family of real sequences derived from randomized one-pile subtraction games. For any subtraction set $S$, we allow any valid number of chips $s\in S$ to be removed at equal probability at…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
In an election, we are given a set of voters, each having a preference list over a set of candidates, that are distributed on a social network. We consider a scenario where voters may change their preference lists as a consequence of the…
Some distinguished types of voters, as vetoers, passers or nulls, as well as some others, play a significant role in voting systems because they are either the most powerful or the least powerful voters in the game independently of the…
Game theory is a very profound study on distributed decision-making behavior and has been extensively developed by many scholars. However, many existing works rely on certain strict assumptions such as knowing the opponent's private…