Related papers: Discrete & Bayesian Transaction Fee Mechanisms
In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…
To allocate transactions to blocks, cryptocurrencies use an auction-like transaction fee mechanism (TFM). A conjecture of Roughgarden [44] asks whether there is a TFM that is incentive compatible for both the users and the miner, and is…
In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM),…
The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize…
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the transaction fee mechanism design fundamentally departs from classical…
Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…
Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…
With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive…
Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user…
Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…
Roughgarden (2020) initiates the study of Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs), and posits that the on-chain game of a ``good'' TFM should be on-chain simple (OnCS), i.e., incentive compatible for users and the miner. Recent work of Ganesh,…
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of TFMs and proposed three requirements: user incentive…
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the…
Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory. \cite{chung2023foundations} introduce the notion of a…
Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…
In the Bitcoin system, miners are incentivized to join the system and validate transactions through fees paid by the users. A simple "pay your bid" auction has been employed to determine the transaction fees. Recently, Lavi, Sattath and…
We study a mechanism design problem in the blockchain proof-of-stake (PoS) protocol. Our main objective is to extend the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) recently proposed in Chung and Shi (SODA, p.3856-3899, 2023), so as to incorporate a…
In the Bitcoin system, transaction fees serve as an incentive for blockchain confirmations. In general, a transaction with a higher fee is likely to be included in the next block mined, whereas a transaction with a smaller fee or no fee may…
Bitcoin mining presents a significant economic incentive for efficient hashing and broadcast of data, both parameters stemming from the Proofs of Work used to advance the network. This incentive has led to the development of Bitcoin…