Related papers: Implementing Fairness Constraints in Markets Using…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
In this work, we study a generalized Fisher market model that incorporates social influence. In this extended model, a buyer's utility depends not only on their own resource allocation but also on the allocations received by their…
In this paper, we present a simplified framework to represent competition, coordination and bargaining in fisheries when they operate under financial and technological constraints. Competition within constraints leads to a particular type…
We develop a stochastic equilibrium model for an electricity market with asymmetric renewable energy forecasts. In our setting, market participants optimize their profits using public information about a conditional expectation of energy…
We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for two market equilibrium models: linear Fisher market (LFM) equilibrium and first-price pacing equilibrium (FPPE). LFM arises from fair resource allocation systems such as…
Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single definition, we…
I characterize optimal government policy in a sticky-price economy with different types of consumers and endogenous financial constraints in the banking and entrepreneurial sectors. The competitive equilibrium allocation is constrained…
We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling, cloud…
Many interesting problems in the Internet industry can be framed as a two-sided marketplace problem. Examples include search applications and recommender systems showing people, jobs, movies, products, restaurants, etc. Incorporating…
Dynamic, risk-based pricing can systematically exclude vulnerable consumer groups from essential resources such as health insurance and consumer credit. We show that a regulator can realign private incentives with social objectives through…
Following the work of Babaioff et al, we consider the pricing game with strategic vendors and a single buyer, modeling a scenario in which multiple competing vendors have very good knowledge of a buyer, as is common in online markets. We…
In this paper, we bring consumer theory to bear in the analysis of Fisher markets whose buyers have arbitrary continuous, concave, homogeneous (CCH) utility functions representing locally non-satiated preferences. The main tools we use are…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
This paper aims to investigate and achieve seller-side fairness within online marketplaces, where many sellers and their items are not sufficiently exposed to customers in an e-commerce platform. This phenomenon raises concerns regarding…
Two-sided marketplaces embody heterogeneity in incentives: producers seek exposure while consumers seek relevance, and balancing these competing objectives through constrained optimization is now a standard practice. Yet real platforms face…
The Fisher market equilibrium for private goods and the Lindahl equilibrium for public goods are classic and fundamental solution concepts for market equilibria. While Fisher market equilibria have been well-studied, the theoretical…
Competitive equilibrium is a central concept in economics with numerous applications beyond markets, such as scheduling, fair allocation of goods, or bandwidth distribution in networks. Computation of competitive equilibria has received a…
We study equilibria of markets with $m$ heterogeneous indivisible goods and $n$ consumers with combinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist when valuations are not gross substitutes.…
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (typically the valuation of every buyer for every…