Related papers: Natural Gradient Ascent in Evolutionary Games
Evolutionary algorithms, inspired by natural evolution, aim to optimize difficult objective functions without computing derivatives. Here we detail the relationship between population genetics and evolutionary optimization and formulate a…
We integrate dual-process theories of human cognition with evolutionary game theory to study the evolution of automatic and controlled decision-making processes. We introduce a model where agents who make decisions using either automatic or…
We establish a theoretical framework to address evolutionary dynamics of spatial games under strong selection. As the selection intensity tends to infinity, strategy competition unfolds in the deterministic way of winners taking all. We…
This paper presents Natural Evolution Strategies (NES), a recent family of algorithms that constitute a more principled approach to black-box optimization than established evolutionary algorithms. NES maintains a parameterized distribution…
We consider a simple mathematical model of gradual Darwinian evolution in continuous time and continuous trait space, due to intraspecific competition for common resource in an asexually reproducing population in constant environment, while…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
We study a class of evolutionary game dynamics defined by balancing a gain determined by the game's payoffs against a cost of motion that captures the difficulty with which the population moves between states. Costs of motion are…
We consider the evolutionary trajectories traced out by an infinite population undergoing mutation-selection dynamics in static, uncorrelated random fitness landscapes. Starting from the population that consists of a single genotype, the…
In this paper, we deal with the equilibrium selection problem, which amounts to steering a population of individuals engaged in strategic game-theoretic interactions to a desired collective behavior. In the literature, this problem has been…
We propose a simple model of network co-evolution in a game-dynamical system of interacting agents that play repeated games with their neighbors, and adapt their behaviors and network links based on the outcome of those games. The…
Evolutionary game theory studies populations that change in response to an underlying game. Often, the functional form relating outcome to player attributes or strategy is complex, preventing mathematical progress. In this work, we…
We propose a game-theoretic dynamics of a population of replicating individuals. It consists of two parts: the standard replicator one and a migration between two different habitats. We consider symmetric two-player games with two…
A new mathematical model for evolutionary games on graphs is proposed to extend the classical replicator equation to finite populations of players organized on a network with generic topology. Classical results from game theory,…
When a prediction algorithm serves a collection of users, disparities in prediction quality are likely to emerge. If users respond to accurate predictions by increasing engagement, inviting friends, or adopting trends, repeated learning…
A partial differential equation is derived, describing the replicator dynamics with mutations of games with a continuous strategy space. This equation is then applied to continuous versions of symmetric 2x2 games, such as the Prisoners…
Efficient dynamic spectrum access mechanism is crucial for improving the spectrum utilization. In this paper, we consider the dynamic spectrum access mechanism design with both complete and incomplete network information. When the network…
The replicator-mutator equation is a model for populations of individuals carrying different traits, with a fitness function mediating their ability to replicate, and a stochastic model for mutation. We derive analytical solutions for the…
We consider a model of cultural evolution for a strategy selection in a population of individuals who interact in a game theoretic framework. The evolution combines individual learning of the environment (population strategy profile),…
The replicator equation is a simple model of evolution that leads to stable form of Nash Equilibrium, Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS). It has been studied in connection with Evolutionary Game Theory and was originally developed for…
This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…