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The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spatial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic approximations…
We study the evolutionary dynamics of games under environmental feedback using replicator equations for two interacting populations. One key feature is to consider jointly the co-evolution of the dynamic payoff matrices and the state of the…
This paper unifies the concepts of evolutionary games and quantum strategies. First, we state the formulation and properties of classical evolutionary strategies, with focus on the destinations of evolution in 2-player 2-strategy games. We…
Game theory is the standard tool used to model strategic interactions in evolutionary biology and social science. Traditional game theory studies the equilibria of simple games. But is traditional game theory applicable if the game is…
The stable cooperation ratio of spatial evolutionary games has been widely studied using simulations or approximate analysis methods. However, sometimes such ``stable'' cooperation ratios obtained via approximate methods might not be…
Evolutionary games provide the theoretical backbone for many aspects of our social life: from cooperation to crime, from climate inaction to imperfect vaccination and epidemic spreading, from antibiotics overuse to biodiversity…
The introduction of concepts of Game Theory and Ordinary Differential Equations into Biology gave birth to the field of Evolutionary Stable Strategies, with applications in Biology, Genetics, Politics, Economics and others. In special, the…
We propose a learning dynamics to model how strategic agents repeatedly play a continuous game while relying on an information platform to learn an unknown payoff-relevant parameter. In each time step, the platform updates a belief estimate…
We report on new stability conditions for evolutionary dynamics in the context of population games. We adhere to the prevailing framework consisting of many agents, grouped into populations, that interact noncooperatively by selecting…
The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped into the classical game of complete information where…
Game theoretic tools are utilized to analyze a one-locus continuous selection model of sex-specific meiotic drive by considering nonequivalence of the viabilities of reciprocal heterozygotes that might be noticed at an imprinted locus. The…
Knowing the strategy of an opponent in a competitive environment conveys obvious evolutionary advantages. But this information is costly, and the benefit of being informed may not necessarily offset the additional cost. Here we introduce…
Interacting particle systems of interest in evolutionary game theory introduced in the probability literature consist of variants of the voter model in which each site is occupied by one player. The goal of this paper is to initiate the…
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…
An ecosystem is a nonlinear dynamical system, its orbits giving rise to the observed complexity in the system. The diverse components of the ecosystem interact in discrete time to give rise to emergent features that determine the trajectory…
The introduction of concepts of Game Theory and Ordinary Differential Equations into Biology gave birth to the field of Evolutionary Stable Strategies, with applications in Biology, Genetics, Politics, Economics and others. In special, the…
Two cases of evolutionary stable strategy with periodic payoffs are studied. The first is a generalization of Uyttendaele et al. The second is prisoner's dilemma with periodic payoff. It is shown that reducing the defection payoff by a…
This paper proposes a co-evolutionary model of directed graphs and three opinions, i.e., conservative$(+)$, neutral$(\odot)$ and liberal$(-)$. Agents update both opinions and social relationships with bias. We find that an emergent game…
Coevolutionary game dynamics is the result of players that may change their strategies and their network of interaction. For such games, and based on interpreting strategies as configurations, strategy-to-payoff maps can be defined for…