Related papers: Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPAD
We investigate the problem of equilibrium computation for "large" $n$-player games. Large games have a Lipschitz-type property that no single player's utility is greatly affected by any other individual player's actions. In this paper, we…
Variational inequality problems allow for capturing an expansive class of problems, including convex optimization problems, convex Nash games and economic equilibrium problems, amongst others. Yet in most practical settings, such problems…
The convex feasibility problem consists in finding a point in the intersection of a finite family of closed convex sets. When the intersection is empty, a best compromise is to search for a point that minimizes the sum of the squared…
In an epsilon-approximate Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most epsilon in expectation by unilateral deviation. An epsilon well-supported approximate Nash equilibrium has the stronger requirement that every pure strategy used with…
Zero-sum games arise in a wide variety of problems, including robust optimization and adversarial learning. However, algorithms deployed for finding a local Nash equilibrium in these games often converge to non-Nash stationary points. This…
We study the existence and computation of Nash equilibria in concave games where the players' admissible strategies are subject to shared coupling constraints. Under playerwise concavity of constraints, we prove existence of Nash…
Given $n$ non-vertical lines in 3-space, their vertical depth (above/below) relation can contain cycles. We show that the lines can be cut into $O(n^{3/2}\mathop{\mathrm{polylog}} n)$ pieces, such that the depth relation among these pieces…
The rank of a bimatrix game (A,B) is defined as rank(A+B). Computing a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a rank-$0$, i.e., zero-sum game is equivalent to linear programming (von Neumann'28, Dantzig'51). In 2005, Kannan and Theobald gave an FPTAS for…
We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in simple stochastic multiplayer games. We show that restricting the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to undecidability. In…
We present a series of almost settled inapproximability results for three fundamental problems. The first in our series is the subexponential-time inapproximability of the maximum independent set problem, a question studied in the area of…
We introduce Cut-and-Play, a practically-efficient algorithm for computing Nash equilibria in simultaneous non-cooperative games where players decide via nonconvex and possibly unbounded optimization problems with separable payoff…
The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their…
Introducing inequality constraints in Gaussian process (GP) models can lead to more realistic uncertainties in learning a great variety of real-world problems. We consider the finite-dimensional Gaussian approach from Maatouk and Bay (2017)…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
The iteration complexity of the block-coordinate descent (BCD) type algorithm has been under extensive investigation. It was recently shown that for convex problems the classical cyclic BCGD (block coordinate gradient descent) achieves an…
We consider the parity variants of basic problems studied in fine-grained complexity. We show that finding the exact solution is just as hard as finding its parity (i.e. if the solution is even or odd) for a large number of classical…
The approximate Carath\'eodory problem in general form is as follows: Given two symmetric convex bodies $P,Q \subseteq \mathbb{R}^m$, a parameter $k \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\mathbf{z} \in \textrm{conv}(X)$ with $X \subseteq P$, find…
We consider the problem of dividing a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. This problem has been studied under various objectives in both the computer science and the operations research literature. Our main…
We investigate the complexity of computing approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games. Our main algorithmic result is the following: For any $n$-player anonymous game with a bounded number of strategies and any constant $\delta>0$, an…
While Online Gradient Descent and other no-regret learning procedures are known to efficiently converge to a coarse correlated equilibrium in games where each agent's utility is concave in their own strategy, this is not the case when…