Related papers: Pure-Circuit: Tight Inapproximability for PPAD
In this paper, we aim to design a distributed approximate algorithm for seeking Nash equilibria of an aggregative game. Due to the local set constraints of each player, projectionbased algorithms have been widely employed for solving such…
In an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium, a player can gain at most $\epsilon$ by unilaterally changing his behaviour. For two-player (bimatrix) games with payoffs in $[0,1]$, the best-known$\epsilon$ achievable in polynomial time is 0.3393. In…
Approximate simulation, an extension of simulation relations from formal methods to continuous systems, is a powerful tool for hierarchical control of complex systems. Finding an approximate simulation relation between the full "concrete"…
In recent years, numerous vision and learning tasks have been (re)formulated as nonconvex and nonsmooth programmings(NNPs). Although some algorithms have been proposed for particular problems, designing fast and flexible optimization…
Conjunctive query (CQ) evaluation is NP-complete, but becomes tractable for fragments of bounded hypertreewidth. Approximating a hard CQ by a query from such a fragment can thus allow for an efficient approximate evaluation. While…
Nearly a decade ago, Azrieli and Shmaya introduced the class of $\lambda$-Lipschitz games in which every player's payoff function is $\lambda$-Lipschitz with respect to the actions of the other players. They showed that such games admit…
Cut games are among the most fundamental strategic games in algorithmic game theory. It is well-known that computing an exact pure Nash equilibrium in these games is PLS-hard, so research has focused on computing approximate equilibria. We…
We study the consensus-halving problem of dividing an object into two portions, such that each of $n$ agents has equal valuation for the two portions. The $\epsilon$-approximate consensus-halving problem allows each agent to have an…
In this paper, an inexact proximal-point penalty method is studied for constrained optimization problems, where the objective function is non-convex, and the constraint functions can also be non-convex. The proposed method approximately…
In this paper, we propose a method for solving a PPAD-complete problem [Papadimitriou, 1994]. Given is the payoff matrix $C$ of a symmetric bimatrix game $(C, C^T)$ and our goal is to compute a Nash equilibrium of $(C, C^T)$. In this paper,…
Pseudo-games are a natural and well-known generalization of normal-form games, in which the actions taken by each player affect not only the other players' payoffs, as in games, but also the other players' strategy sets. The solution…
Congestion games constitute an important class of games in which computing an exact or even approximate pure Nash equilibrium is in general {\sf PLS}-complete. We present a surprisingly simple polynomial-time algorithm that computes…
The classical NP-hard feedback arc set problem (FASP) and feedback vertex set problem (FVSP) ask for a minimum set of arcs $\varepsilon \subseteq E$ or vertices $\nu \subseteq V$ whose removal $G\setminus \varepsilon$, $G\setminus \nu$…
A major open question in algorithmic game theory is whether normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCE) can be computed efficiently in succinct games such as extensive-form games [DFF+25,6PR24,FP23,HvS08,VSF08,PR08]. Motivated by this…
Since the celebrated PPAD-completeness result for Nash equilibria in bimatrix games, a long line of research has focused on polynomial-time algorithms that compute $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria. Finding the best possible…
Several works have shown unconditional hardness (via integrality gaps) of computing equilibria using strong hierarchies of convex relaxations. Such results however only apply to the problem of computing equilibria that optimize a certain…
Generalized circuits are an important tool in the study of the computational complexity of equilibrium approximation problems. However, in this paper, we reveal that they have a conceptual flaw, namely that the solution concept is not…
We study symmetric bimatrix games that also have the common-payoff property, i.e., the two players receive the same payoff at any outcome of the game. Due to the symmetry property, these games are guaranteed to have symmetric Nash…
The Wasserstein barycenter problem seeks a probability measure that minimizes the weighted average of the Wasserstein distances to a given collection of probability measures. We study the discrete setting, where each measure has finite…
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…