Related papers: CacheQL: Quantifying and Localizing Cache Side-Cha…
Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum…
We present the first micro-architectural side-channel attack which runs entirely in the browser. In contrast to other works in this genre, this attack does not require the attacker to install any software on the victim's machine -- to…
Modern computer processors use microarchitectural optimization mechanisms to improve performance. As a downside, such optimizations are prone to introducing side-channel vulnerabilities. Speculative loading of memory, called prefetching, is…
Caches on the modern commodity CPUs have become one of the major sources of side-channel leakages and been abused as a new attack vector. To thwart the cache-based side-channel attacks, two types of countermeasures have been proposed:…
Microarchitectural timing side channels have been thoroughly investigated as a security threat in hardware designs featuring shared buffers (e.g., caches) or parallelism between attacker and victim task execution. However, contradicting…
Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…
Homomorphic encryption provides many opportunities for privacy-aware processing, including with methods related to machine learning. Many of our existing cryptographic methods have been shown in the past to be susceptible to side channel…
Besides cryptographic secrets, side-channel attacks also leak sensitive user input. The most accurate attacks exploit cache timings or interrupt information to monitor keystroke timings and subsequently infer typed words and sentences.…
This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover the…
For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrated a new…
We study a sequential coherent side-channel model in which an adversarial probe qubit interacts with a target qubit during a hidden gate sequence. Repeating the same hidden sequence for $N$ shots yields an empirical full-correlation record:…
Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are proven secure based on fundamental physical laws, however, the proofs consider a well-defined setting and encoding of the sent quantum signals only. Side channels, where the encoded quantum state…
This paper demonstrates a new side-channel that enables an adversary to extract sensitive information about inference inputs in large language models (LLMs) based on the number of output tokens in the LLM response. We construct attacks…
The prosperous development of cloud computing and machine learning as a service has led to the widespread use of media software to process confidential media data. This paper explores an adversary's ability to launch side channel analyses…
The identification of vulnerabilities is an important element in the software development life cycle to ensure the security of software. While vulnerability identification based on the source code is a well studied field, the identification…
Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…
Recent discovery of security attacks in advanced processors, known as Spectre and Meltdown, has resulted in high public alertness about security of hardware. The root cause of these attacks is information leakage across "covert channels"…
Side-channel risks of Intel's SGX have recently attracted great attention. Under the spotlight is the newly discovered page-fault attack, in which an OS-level adversary induces page faults to observe the page-level access patterns of a…
Spectre, Meltdown, and related attacks have demonstrated that kernels, hypervisors, trusted execution environments, and browsers are prone to information disclosure through micro-architectural weaknesses. However, it remains unclear as to…
Code cloning is a common practice in software development, but it poses significant security risks by propagating vulnerabilities across cloned segments. To address this challenge, we introduce srcVul, a scalable, precise detection approach…