Related papers: CacheQL: Quantifying and Localizing Cache Side-Cha…
While cryptographic algorithms such as the ubiquitous Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) are secure, *physical implementations* of these algorithms in hardware inevitably 'leak' sensitive data such as cryptographic keys. A particularly…
Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…
Supervised deep learning has emerged as an effective tool for carrying out power side-channel attacks on cryptographic implementations. While increasingly-powerful deep learning-based attacks are regularly published, comparatively-little…
Cache template attacks demonstrated automated leakage of user input in shared libraries. However, for large binaries, the runtime is prohibitively high. Other automated approaches focused on cryptographic implementations and media software…
Power-based side-channel is a serious security threat to the System on Chip (SoC). The secret information is leaked from the power profile of the system while a cryptographic algorithm is running. The mitigation requires efforts from both…
Cryptographic research takes software timing side channels seriously. Approaches to mitigate them include constant-time coding and techniques to enforce such practices. However, recent attacks like Meltdown [42], Spectre [37], and…
Compression algorithms are widely used as they save memory without losing data. However, elimination of redundant symbols and sequences in data leads to a compression side channel. So far, compression attacks have only focused on the…
Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot easily be updated…
Timing-based side and covert channels in processor caches continue to be a threat to modern computers. This work shows for the first time a systematic, large-scale analysis of Arm devices and the detailed results of attacks the processors…
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have become a major concern to the security community due to their non-invasive feature, low-cost, and effectiveness in extracting secret information from hardware implementation of cryto algorithms.…
The widespread adoption of TLS 1.3 and QUIC has rendered payload content invisible, shifting traffic analysis toward side-channel features. However, rigorous justification for why side-channel leakage is inevitable in encrypted…
Privacy leakage in LLM agents is often studied through individual storage or execution components, such as memory modules, retrieval pipelines, or tool-mediated artifacts. However, these settings are typically analyzed in isolation, making…
Side Channel Analysis (SCA) presents a clear threat to privacy and security in modern computing systems. The vast majority of communications are secured through cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are often provably-secure from a…
Timing side channels have been used to extract cryptographic keys and sensitive documents, even from trusted enclaves. In this paper, we focus on cache side channels created by access to shared code or data in the memory hierarchy. This…
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…
With increasingly sophisticated cyber-adversaries able to access a wider repertoire of mechanisms to implant malware such as ransomware, CPU/GPU keyloggers, and stealthy kernel rootkits, there is an urgent need for techniques to detect and…
In the last years, a series of side channels have been discovered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spectre…
This paper presents an approach for side channel cryptanalysis with iterative approximate Bayesian inference, based on sequential decoding methods. Reliability information about subkey hypotheses is generated in the form of likelihoods, and…
Formal verification of cryptographic protocols typically relies on symbolic models that abstract away compiled code and microarchitectural side channels, leaving a gap between verified specifications and deployed executables. We present a…
Clueless is a binary instrumentation tool that characterises explicit cache side channel vulnerabilities of programs. It detects the transformation of data values into addresses by tracking dynamic instruction dependencies. Clueless tags…