Related papers: Implementation with Uncertain Evidence
Existing settings of decentralized learning either require players to have full information or the system to have certain special structure that may be hard to check and hinder their applicability to practical systems. To overcome this, we…
Empirically, many strategic settings are characterized by stable outcomes in which players' decisions are publicly observed, yet no player takes the opportunity to deviate. To analyze such situations in the presence of incomplete…
This paper investigates stochastic generalized dynamic games with coupling chance constraints, where agents have incomplete information about uncertainties satisfying a concentration of measure property. This problem, in general, is…
We study discounted infinitely repeated games in which players agree on a cooperative mixed action profile but, at each step, observe only the realized pure actions. This form of imperfect monitoring breaks classical trigger strategies,…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
In this paper, we focus on the stochastic generalized Nash equilibrium problem (SGNEP) which is an important and widely-used model in many different fields. In this model, subject to certain global resource constraints, a set of…
In this paper, we investigate the probabilistic variants of the strategy logics ATL and ATL* under imperfect information. Specifically, we present novel decidability and complexity results when the model transitions are stochastic and…
In this paper, we study the infinite-time mean field games with discounting, establishing an equilibrium where individual optimal strategies collectively regenerate the mean-field distribution. To solve this problem, we partition all agents…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
Acquiring ground truth labels for unlabelled data can be a costly procedure, since it often requires manual labour that is error-prone. Consequently, the available amount of labelled data is increasingly reduced due to the limitations of…
We consider an example of stochastic games with partial, asymmetric and non-classical information. We obtain relevant equilibrium policies using a new approach which allows managing the belief updates in a structured manner. Agents have…
We study the plausibility of sub-optimal Nash equilibria of the direct revelation mechanism associated with a strategy-proof social choice function. By using the recently introduced empirical equilibrium analysis (Velez and Brown, 2019,…
Finite-player dynamic games with dispersed private information are difficult because actions both move payoffs and reshape what opponents learn, generating hierarchies of beliefs about beliefs. This paper provides a recursive representation…
The problem of state estimation for unobservable distribution systems is considered. A deep learning approach to Bayesian state estimation is proposed for real-time applications. The proposed technique consists of distribution learning of…
In many applications, we want to influence the decisions of independent agents by designing incentives for their actions. We revisit a fundamental problem in this area, called GAME IMPLEMENTATION: Given a game in standard form and a set of…
We address the following state comparison problem: is it possible to design an experiment enabling us to unambiguously decide (based on the observed outcome statistics) on the sameness or difference of two unknown state preparations without…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
We introduce a new hypothesis testing-based learning dynamics in which players update their strategies by combining hypothesis testing with utility-driven exploration. In this dynamics, each player forms beliefs about opponents' strategies…
The theory of full implementation has been criticized for using integer/modulo games which admit no equilibrium (Jackson (1992)). To address the critique, we revisit the classical Nash implementation problem due to Maskin (1999) but allow…
In the framework of stochastic zero-sum differential games, we establish a verification theorem, inspired by those existing in stochastic control, to provide sufficient conditions for a pair of feedback controls to form a Nash equilibrium.…