Related papers: On Reachable Assignments under Dichotomous Prefere…
We study the problem of allocating $m$ indivisible items to $n$ agents with additive utilities. It is desirable for the allocation to be both fair and efficient, which we formalize through the notions of envy-freeness and Pareto-optimality.…
Finding an envy-free allocation of indivisible resources to agents is a central task in many multiagent systems. Often, non-trivial envy-free allocations do not exist, and, when they do, finding them can be computationally hard. Classical…
We address a problem of area protection in graph-based scenarios with multiple agents. The problem consists of two adversarial teams of agents that move in an undirected graph shared by both teams. Agents are placed in vertices of the…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible items subject to conflict constraints. In this framework, the items are represented as the vertices of a graph, with edges corresponding to conflicts between pairs of items. Each agent is assigned…
Stable matching is a fundamental problem studied both in economics and computer science. The task is to find a matching between two sides of agents that have preferences over who they want to be matched with. A matching is stable if no pair…
We consider a bilevel continuous knapsack problem where the leader controls the capacity of the knapsack, while the follower chooses a feasible packing maximizing his own profit. The leader's aim is to optimize a linear objective function…
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods to multiple agents. Recent work [Bouveret and Lang, 2011] focused on allocating goods in a sequential way, and studied what is the "best" sequence of agents to pick objects based…
We study the house allocation problem in a setting where agents are connected by a graph representing friendships. In this model, two agents can only envy each other if they are neighbors (i.e., friends) in the graph. Each agent has a set…
We study the assignment problem of objects to agents with heterogeneous preferences under distributional constraints. Each agent is associated with a publicly known type and has a private ordinal ranking over objects. We are interested in…
In the assignment problem, a set of items must be allocated to unit-demand agents who express ordinal preferences (rankings) over the items. In the assignment problem with priorities, agents with higher priority are entitled to their…
We consider the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with additive non-negative normalized valuations, with the goal of obtaining high value guarantees, that is, close to the proportional share for each agent. We prove that…
We consider the problem of delivering $m$ messages between specified source-target pairs in a weighted undirected graph, by $k$ mobile agents initially located at distinct nodes of the graph. Each agent consumes energy proportional to the…
We study the problem of rendezvous of two mobile agents starting at distinct locations in an unknown graph. The agents have distinct labels and walk in synchronous steps. However the graph is unlabelled and the agents have no means of…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
We study the complexity of the Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem (DCSP) on a synchronous, anonymous network from a theoretical standpoint. In this setting, variables and constraints are controlled by agents which communicate with…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible objects to a set of rational agents where each agent's final utility depends on the intrinsic valuation of the allocated item as well as the allocation within the agent's local neighbourhood.…
Preferences, fundamental in all forms of strategic behavior and collective decision-making, in their raw form, are an abstract ordering on a set of alternatives. Agents, we assume, revise their preferences as they gain more information…
We consider a novel setting where a set of items are matched to the same set of agents repeatedly over multiple rounds. Each agent gets exactly one item per round, which brings interesting challenges to finding efficient and/or fair {\em…
We study sequential multi-issue trading between two greedily rational agents who exchange resources from a finite set of categories. Each agent's utility depends on its allocation, but the offering agent does not know the responding agent's…
We study balanced exchange problems in which agents with responsive preferences are endowed with multiple indivisible objects and can trade without transfers (e.g. shift exchange, time-banking). Eliciting full preferences over bundles is…